Original Transcript:
I collected all the numbers and data for this video between July 1st and September 23rd, 2026, which is also the same day I recorded this video.
Introduction and Housekeeping
Greetings, NIRVC family of customers and friends. Before we get started, a little housekeeping first. If you are new to our videos, I unfortunately speak in a monotone voice. Think Ben Stein and Ferris Bueller’s day off. Boring, I totally understand. Second, this is going to be a long video, and I do mean a very long video. Think of it in terms of a semester. So, if you’re looking for something you can watch between meetings, this is not it. I suggest copious amounts of caffeine and sustenance. I personally will have lots of Diet Coke and snacks nearby as this recording will be shot in one sitting. And let’s be honest here, if you’re so bored that you can watch this entire video all the way through in one sitting, you’re probably not the person anyone wants to hang out with.
And we probably both need to get a life. I promise this is going to be anything but Ted Lasso entertaining. All kidding aside, this video has 13 chapters and you will need to use them extensively. So, you really don’t need to consume this entire video in one sitting. Watch a chapter, stop, ponder, verify the numbers, challenge the logic, and then come back for the next chapter. And each chapter builds the foundation for the next chapter.
So skipping ahead will leave you confused. Please revisit a section if something does not make sense the first time through. In fact, that’s exactly how I hope people will use this video. This video is intended to be studied as much as it is to be watched. I have spent 47 years investing in and owning businesses across a range of industries, including banks and mortgage companies. I also purchased my first motor home in 1985, and I’ve been living full-time in a motor home since 2013, and today I am also a motor home dealer. Every one of those experiences has taught me something.
Some lessons were inexpensive, many required paying a great deal of tuition. Either way, each one of them added another arrow to my quiver. And over time, I found myself looking at businesses less through the lenses of what they sell and more through the lens of how capital moves through them. Who supplies the capital? Who controls it? Who earns the return? Who bears the risk? What behavior do the incentives reward? And what happens when those incentives become disconnected from economic reality?
That last question has a name. It’s called moral hazard. In plain English, a moral hazard is what happens when one party gets to take the risk and another party gets stuck with the loss. Remember that definition. You’re going to see it again and again when we get to the later chapters. My goal with this video is not just to explain what is happening in the RV industry. My goal is to understand why it’s happening, what the rest of us can learn from it, and whether there is still time to change the outcome deliberately.
Here is the uncomfortable part. The people who can actually alter the course do not sit inside the industry. They sit outside of it. They are the bankers who supply the industry with its capital and with the moral hazard that capital rides it on. I hope bankers and regulators watch this. And I really mean that. I still know people in banking, regulators, and a couple of members of the Federal Reserve and I intend to put this in front of them. If the people who are actually regulating the banks who supply the capital to the industry come to the same conclusions I have, then perhaps this industry still has an opportunity to address the problems deliberately before the market addresses them brutally.
One last request. If you disagree with something, I say please tell me in the comments. I genuinely mean that. But bring data. Here at NIRVC, in God we trust. All others must bring data. Feelings can be argued. Numbers cannot. If I have a number wrong, show me. If I have missed something, show me. If there’s a better explanation for the data, I want to hear it. That is how all of us learn. Let’s get on with the analysis and pull the thread of the industry sweater to see where it leads us.
Chapter 1: A Turning Point
For 47 years, I’ve spent my life looking at businesses through the eyes of an investor, a fund manager, banker, mortgage banker, real estate developer, property owner, and business owner. I’ve always been interested in how businesses made money, how they allocate capital, where the risk resides, who is being compensated for assuming that risk, and whether the returns being generated justified the capital being employed. Those questions have shaped almost every business decision I’ve ever made.
And over the years, they have led me to one axiom that I have repeated frequently. Capital always goes where it’s best treated. By that, I don’t mean capital has feelings. I mean investors, lenders, entrepreneurs, and businesses ultimately allocate capital towards the opportunities they believe will produce the best long-term returns relative to the risk they are assuming. Capital has a cost. Risk has a price. When either one is mispriced, markets correct it. That way of thinking is what led me down the path we are about to travel together.
I’ve spent decades around motor homes and I’ve experienced this industry as an owner of several motor homes as a full-timer and as a dealer and as someone who previously owned banks. I’ve never manufactured a chassis. I’ve never manufactured the components that go into a motor home. I’ve never assembled motor homes as an original equipment manufacturer. Therefore, I won’t pretend to understand those businesses from the inside the way people running them do.
But I do understand capital, credit, inventory, financial statements, returns on invested capital, and incentives. A couple of months ago, something happened that caused me to look at our industry through a lens I had never looked through before. On June 30th, 2026, Patrick Industries and LCI Industries announced that they were merging in an all-stock transaction. Anyone outside the RV industry could be forgiven for wondering why that should matter to a motor home dealer or to someone who owns a motor home.
Patrick and LCI are largely invisible to the retail customer. Their names are not badged across the front and rear caps of any motor home. Yet between them, they manufacture an enormous number of the components that ultimately become a part of the motor home. When I began studying the transaction, I found myself thinking less about the merger itself and more about the economics surrounding it. Most people think of a motor home as a product manufactured by the name appearing on the front and rear caps of the motor home.
In reality, a motor home is the final assembly of products and systems supplied by a surprisingly large number of companies. For example, the chassis may come from Freightliner, Spartan, Ford, Mercedes-Benz, Ram, or any other chassis manufacturer. Engines, transmissions, axles, brakes, wheels, tires, air conditioning systems, refrigerators, furnaces, generators, windows, doors, furniture, awnings, electronics, plumbing systems, lighting, slide mechanics, leveling systems, appliances, countertops, cabinetry, hardware, and countless of other components come from suppliers. The company whose name appears on the motor home assembled all those pieces into a finished product.
They are in effect parts assemblers. That distinction is important because the economics of the participants are very different. For purposes of understanding the structure rather than producing an audited bill of materials, I think of motor home economics in four broad buckets. The chassis represents anywhere from 20% to 40% of the manufacturer’s cost depending upon whether it is a class A, B, or C and whether it is a diesel or gas engine.
Direct manufacturing labor represents approximately 10%. The motor home manufacturer earns approximately 10% gross profit. The remaining 40 to 60% is represented by the parts, components, systems, and materials that ultimately become the finished product. I want to emphasize that this is an illustrative economic framework, not a claim that every motor home produced by every manufacturer has exactly the same cost structure. The point is to understand where the economic activity occurs.
When you look at a finished motor home, a tremendous amount of the value has already been created by the chassis manufacturer and the component suppliers before the final manufacturer, the parts assembler if you will, finishes assembling it. That led me to a question I had never seriously asked before. Who has actually made the best returns in the RV industry? The answer became fascinating. I began looking at the publicly reported financial performance of Patrick Industries, LCI Industries, Thor Industries, Winnebago Industries, and Camping World.
They represent different points in the RV economic chain. Patrick and LCI are major component suppliers. Thor and Winnebago are major manufacturers. Camping World is our country’s largest dealer. I look not at a single quarter because a single quarter can be distorted by almost anything but across one, three, five, and 10-year periods. The pattern is remarkably consistent. The businesses that supply components to the industry have produced the highest EBITDA margins across every time period I examine. Higher than the manufacturers who assemble the finished motor homes and certainly higher than the dealers who sell them to customers.
By the way, EBITDA is just an acronym for earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. It is a commonly used measure of operating profitability. In fact, Patrick’s one and three-year margins alone are greater than Thor’s and Camping World’s margins combined. Now, let’s look at combining Patrick and LCI. I find this table stunning. When you combine Patrick and LCI on a weighted average basis, the consistency across all four time periods is remarkable.
The difference between the lowest combined margin, 10% over 3 years, and the highest, 11% over 5 and 10 years is 1 percentage point across a 10-year period. Now look at the margin advantage relative to Thor, Winnebago, and Camping World. The combined component supplier layer of Patrick and LCI has maintained a clear and persistent EBITDA margin advantage over the two largest motor home manufacturers and the largest dealer across every time horizon.
I then looked at absolute EBITDA dollars because margins alone can mislead when companies operate at different scale. Thor has produced the largest absolute EBITDA in dollars because of its enormous scale, but not because of its profit margins. This is an important distinction. I don’t want to manipulate the numbers into saying something they don’t say. But Patrick and LCI together represent approximately 46% of the one-year EBITDA generated by this group and approximately one-third of the 10-year EBITDA.
In other words, Patrick and LCI are taking a larger share of the total EBITDA generated by these five companies today than they did over the entire 10-year period. And I suspect the combined Patrick and LCI will continue to capture an increasing share of the economics across this group because the component supplier business is not burdened by many of the same incentives and inventory risks we are about to examine at the manufacturer and dealer levels.
Regardless, that is an extraordinary economic position for two companies most retail customers have never heard of. It led me to a conclusion that I think is difficult to argue with. The structural winners in the RV industry have been the component suppliers. That doesn’t mean manufacturers and dealers cannot make money. They should. It doesn’t mean Patrick and LCI have done anything improper. Quite the opposite. If I were managing either company, I would be very proud of those results.
They have allocated capital into businesses and products that have generated attractive margins and consistency. That is not something easily done in a highly cyclical industry. The more interesting question is what those returns tell us about the structure of the industry. When Patrick and LCI merge, they are not merely combining two public companies. They are increasing the scale and purchasing power of the most economically powerful layer of the RV supply chain.
They should gain procurement efficiencies. They should eliminate duplicated overhead. They should obtain greater leverage with their own suppliers. Their increased scale should strengthen their pricing power with their customers, the RV manufacturer, and they will be able to allocate capital across a much broader portfolio of products. From an investor’s perspective, that makes a lot of sense because capital always goes where it’s best treated.
The transaction confirmed my long-held belief when looking at the other participants in the industry with the same question. Where is capital being treated well and where is it being treated poorly? Who is earning an appropriate return for the risk being assumed? Who has pricing power? Who has inventory risk? Who’s providing the capital? Who’s guaranteeing that capital? And above all, who’s getting paid first? Who’s getting paid last? Most importantly, what behaviors do these economics reward?
I think you will find the answers to those questions quite revealing. For years, I had blamed the motor home industry’s problem primarily on overproduction. Every time inventory accumulated, every time manufacturers discounted aged units, every time used motor home values fell, and every time dealers got squeezed, I came back to the same criticism. Manufacturers were building too many motor homes and driving up the cost of ownership for the consumer.
I absolutely believe the industry has built too many motor homes for too many years and too many decades. I’ve also come to realize that I’ve been asking the wrong question. The question wasn’t simply why manufacturers kept overbuilding. The better question was why rational people kept behaving in ways that repeatedly produced the same irrational results. When behavior appears economically irrational, I generally assume I don’t yet understand the incentives.
And that’s where our journey really begins.
Chapter 2: The Wrong Question
For years, I thought the industry’s chronic inventory problem was principally a forecasting problem. Manufacturers forecast retail demand, decide how many motor homes to build, and occasionally get the forecast wrong. That explanation is intuitive because every business misforecasts. Consumer confidence changes, interest rates change, fuel prices change, elections happen, recessions happen, a pandemic happens, supply chains get disrupted. There is no shortage of reasons why actual demand can differ from the forecasted demand.
If manufacturers occasionally produce too many motor homes, none of that would be particularly interesting. What bothered me was the word occasionally. When the same directional mistake repeats across multiple decades through different management teams, different economic cycles, different interest rate environments, different political administrations and different dealer bodies, different lenders and different generations of consumers. Eventually, the forecasting becomes difficult to swallow.
Forecasting errors will sometimes be too high and sometimes they will be too low. Over time, they will substantially offset one another. Persistent overproduction is different. Forecasting errors don’t compound for 20 years, let alone 42 years, but incentives do. That realization changed the way I approached the entire problem. Instead of asking, why can’t manufacturers forecast retail demand more accurately? I began asking what financial incentives make continued production rational even when inventory is already too high.
That is a much more uncomfortable question because it changes the problem from one of managerial competence to one of system design. I want to be very careful about that distinction. There are thoughtful, intelligent, experienced people running RV manufacturers. There are thoughtful, intelligent dealers. There are sophisticated banks financing this industry. I know many of these people personally. I don’t believe the industry has experienced four decades of chronic overproduction because everyone responsible for forecasting is incompetent.
In fact, I increasingly believe the opposite. I think people are responding rationally to the incentives immediately in front of them. That brings me to something I believe deeply. Every industry eventually gets the behavior its financial incentives reward. If you reward a salesperson for revenue without regard to margin, don’t be surprised when revenue rises and margin falls. If you reward a manager for short-term profit without charging that manager for the capital employed to create it, don’t be surprised when capital efficiency deteriorates.
If you reward a manufacturer for wholesale shipments before retail customers exist and the financial system allows dealers to absorb those shipments with no investment of cash on their part, well then don’t be surprised when wholesale shipments become detached from retail demand. People respond to incentives. Companies respond to incentives. Capital responds to incentives. The challenge is that every participant can make a decision that appears completely rational from their individual perspective while the aggregate outcome becomes irrational.
That possibility became more clear to me through an exchange I had with the president and CEO of one of our manufacturers. We were discussing depreciation in the condition of the motor home market. conversation centered on why values had fallen so dramatically and why the industry kept finding itself burdened with excess inventory. His perspective, as I understood it, emphasized the difficulty of accurately forecasting a complicated and volatile retail market.
I understood the argument, but I’ve never agreed with it. And the more I thought about our conversation, the less satisfying it became. Manufacturers have enormous visibility into their businesses. They know exactly how many units they build and ship, what remains in their yards, what has gone to each dealer, when the consumer returns their warranty registration, what inventory remains in the field, the age of that inventory, and when dealers begin asking for rebates, assistance, or price protection.
Their field representatives walk dealers lots. They see monthly retail registration. They know their own run rates. Manufacturers are not flying blind. Far from it. They may not know which customer will walk through which dealer’s door tomorrow afternoon, but no participant in the system has better visibility into what is entering the channel and what retail customers are taking out of the channel. That is why I have such a problem with another explanation I’ve increasingly heard bandied about the industry, the bullhip effect.
Don’t get me wrong, the bullhip effect is real. In a traditional supply chain, a relatively small change in consumer demand can become amplified as distorted information moves upstream from retailers to distributors and ultimately to manufacturers. It’s a legitimate explanation when the people making production decisions have poor visibility into true retail demand. But using the bullhip effect as the explanation for decades of chronic motor home production strikes me as ludicrous. The bullhip effect requires distorted information.
The manufacturers have the best information in the entire industry. They can see what they’re putting into the channel. They can see what retail customers are taking out of it. They can see inventory accumulating and aging between those two points. So when shipments repeatedly exceed retail sales and cumulative inventory in the field continues to grow, blaming the bullhip effect asks us to believe that the participant with the best visibility in the industry somehow remained the victim of bad information for years.
I don’t buy it. The bullhip effect may explain a temporary overshoot. It may explain a sudden production response to an unexpected change in demand. It may contribute to an inventory imbalance during a short period of unusual volatility. What it can’t credibly explain in my opinion is the same directional outcome repeating for decades after the excess inventory became plainly visible. At some point an error stops being an error.
At some point bad forecasting stops being an explanation. And at some point invoking the bullhip effect becomes less an explanation for chronic overproduction and more an excuse for avoiding the harder question. Why did production continue after the overproduction was visible? That is the distinction I want the industry to confront. So I come back to incentives. Let’s view the industry as six major economic participants. Each participant is pursuing a rational objective.
The chassis manufacturer wants to sell a chassis. The component supplier wants to sell components. The motor home manufacturer wants to build and ship motor homes. The bank wants to make wellsecured loans and collect interest. The dealer wants to sell motor homes profitably. The owner wants to receive value, service, and a reasonable total cost of ownership. None of those objectives are inherently problematic. The problem appears when the financial incentives among the participants are misaligned.
The component supplier gets paid when the parts are shipped to the manufacturer to build the motor home. The manufacturer gets paid when the motor home is shipped to a dealer. The bank begins earning interest when the dealer borrows against the motor home. The dealer does not realize any economics until a retail customer purchased the motor home. And the motor home owner doesn’t discover his true cost of ownership until the market determines what his motor home is worth years later after all the overproduction in the intervening years, the discounting and the rebates have been accounted for.
Those are all very different clocks. This is where a simple visual helps because the physical movement of the product and the financial structure that supports it are not the same thing. Product moves downstream. The capital comes from outside the dealer. The risk can move back upstream. That distinction will become increasingly more important as we work our way through the rest of this video. The motor home physically moves downstream through the channel towards the owner.
But the capital used to finance that movement and the risk associated with that capital do not remain solely with the party physically holding the motor home. That caused me to start asking a series of questions. Who gets paid before a retail sale takes place? Who carries the inventory? Whose capital finances it? What happens if it doesn’t sell? Who bears the depreciation? And what agreement makes the entire structure possible? The answer to that last question turns out to be one of the most important financial documents in the RV industry. Yet, almost no motor homeowner has ever heard of it.
Chapter 3: The Most Important Agreement You’ve Never Heard Of
There’s an agreement in the RV industry that every floor plan lender understands, every manufacturer understands, and almost no motor home owner has ever heard of. The motor home purchaser doesn’t sign it, and the dealer is not a party to it. It exists between the manufacturer and the bank financing the dealer’s new inventory. It is the manufacturer’s repurchase agreement. Before I explain why I believe this agreement has such a profound effect on the RV industry, we need to start with something more basic. How a dealer pays for the new motor home inventory sitting on its lot.
Dealers do not pay cash for their new motor home inventory. They use a revolving inventory line of credit commonly known as a floor plan line. Suppose a manufacturer invoices a dealer $500,000 for a new motor home. The dealer’s floor plan bank finances 100% of the manufacturer’s invoice on behalf of the dealer. The manufacturer receives its cash. The motor home is delivered to the dealer. The dealer now owes the bank $500,000 and the bank has the motor home as collateral.
How much weight do banks put on the repurchase agreement? Well, let’s take a look at both how much they are willing to advance and what interest rate they charge when a repurchase agreement is present. The bank will finance 100% of the manufacturer’s invoice on a new motor home. However, on a used motor home with the same bank, the same dealer, the same sales lot, it will only advance 70% and never over 80% of wholesale book value.
The difference is the manufacturer’s repurchase agreement. The 20 to 30% difference in the advance rate is the bank telling you how much weight it is putting on that repurchase agreement. Here at NIRVC, we pay 5/8 of a percent higher interest rate on our real estate loans than we do on our new motor home flooring line. One is secured by depreciating motor homes for which no retail customer has yet to appear. The other is secured by real estate that is leased by retail customers whose rent payments more than cover our entire occupancy costs, including the principal and interest on those real estate loans. Make it make sense.
The dealer pays interest while the motor home remains unsold. When the motor home is eventually sold, the dealer pays the floor plan bank and the lean against that unit is released. Conceptually, it is simple. But motor homes create an unusual collateral problem. A motor home is not a treasury bill. Its collateral value does not remain fixed while it sits on the dealer’s lot. It’s a depreciating asset, and time is working against the lender from the moment the loan is made.
A new model year eventually arrives. New technology appears. Interior designs change. Factory incentives change. Other dealers discount similar units. Wholesale book values decline. And simply sitting outside creates its own physical risk. We call that last category of risk lot rot. Batteries discharge. Seals dry, tires age, water finds places it shouldn’t, electronics develop problems, upholstery and finishes are exposed to the heat and cold.
Slide mechanisms sit unused. Generators don’t get exercised. Chassis don’t get driven enough. I tell people that motor homes break if you use them, and they break even more if you don’t. Anyone who has spent enough time around motor homes knows exactly what I mean. That makes floor plan lending a race against time. The lender begins with a loan equal to the full invoice amount of the new motor home, secured by an asset whose market value begins declining long before it sells.
That new motor home takes a drop in value as soon as the next model year arrives and then continues to decline on the first day of every oddnumbered month when new wholesale book values are published. All the while, the floor plan interest clock keeps running. Now, think like a banker. If I’m lending a dealer $500,000 against a $500,000 motor home, and the dealer has no cash equity in the collateral, what happens if the dealer fails?
The bank can repossess the motor home, but what if it’s now worth only $425,000? The bank has a problem. That is where the manufacturer’s repurchase agreement enters the picture. The manufacturer sells the motor home to the dealer. When the floor plan bank finances 100% of the manufacturer’s invoice on behalf of the dealer, the manufacturer’s two-year repurchase obligation begins. Under these agreements, manufacturers agree to repurchase their inventory from the floor plan lender if the dealer defaults during the 2-year period.
The repurchase obligation covers the amount due to the floor plan lender under the contractual repurchase formula, which includes unpaid principal and acred interest. To the bank, that is enormously valuable. Instead of relying solely on the dealer and depreciating collateral, the lender now has a contractual commitment from the manufacturer that produced the motor home. The agreement does not eliminate risk, it transfers it. That distinction will become one of the central themes of this video and it creates the moral hazard I referred to earlier.
The economic consequences of this transaction are significant. The manufacturer gets paid immediately. The bank begins earning interest immediately. The dealer receives inventory without having to write a check for any part of the purchase price of the inventory. The retail purchaser does not yet exist. That is worth thinking about. In most businesses, capital acts as a governor on inventory. If a company has $20 million of equity available for inventory and must put 25% down on every purchase, the amount of inventory it can buy is naturally constrained.
But if the business can finance 100% of its inventory, cash is no longer the limiting factor. The only limit becomes the size of the dealer’s credit line. And if the lender is more willing to extend that credit because manufacturers stand behind the inventory, the dealer’s purchasing capacity expands. Again, this is why I believe the 2-year repurchase agreement became much more than a credit enhancement. It became part of the industry’s production system.
The manufacturer wants to produce. The dealer has floor plan capacity. The bank is willing to finance. The manufacturer stands behind the inventory. The motor home enters the channel. No retail purchaser was required for any of those events to occur for a period of time. The economics can look wonderful to everyone. The manufacturer has revenue. The bank has an earning asset. The dealer has another unit to sell. But time keeps moving. Interest keeps accumulating.
The motor home ages. The next model year arrives. Eventually, the dealer faces curtailments, which we’ll discuss later on. The economics of a motor home that sells in 90 days are radically different from the economics of the same motor home sitting for 12, 18, or 24 months. That is why inventory turns matter so much. A dealer can survive on a relatively thin margin if inventory turns quickly. A dealer cannot indefinitely survive on a thin margin on inventory that barely turns once a year while interest and operating costs continue to accumulate.
The agreement solved a legitimate lending problem. Banks needed protection against lending on rapidly depreciating inventory. But the solution also created a new incentive and along with it a moral hazard. It made it easier to finance more inventory. And once an industry makes something easier to finance, it usually gets a lot more of it. Now that we understand the mechanics, we can stop explaining them. From this point forward, the more interesting question is what this structure does to behavior.
Chapter 4: Whose Balance Sheet Is Really at Risk
Now that we understand how floor plan financing and the 2-year repurchase agreement work, we can focus on what they change. The first thing they change is the amount of dealer equity required to put another motor home into inventory. Normally, capital imposes discipline on purchasing decisions. If you have to write a meaningful check to purchase an asset, you naturally ask whether that asset is likely to generate an adequate return on the capital you are committing.
You also ask whether your capital could earn a better return somewhere else. I have always said that capital will always go where it’s best treated. Investors, lenders, and businesses allocate capital towards the opportunities they believe will produce the best long-term risk adjusted returns. The cost of that capital and the risk of losing it normally impose discipline on how much of anything a rational business purchases. But what happens when the dealer doesn’t have to invest any equity capital?
The normal capital allocation question changes dramatically. Imagine two dealers considering whether to purchase another $500,000 motor home. One dealer has to invest $100,000 of its own cash and borrow the remaining $400,000. The other dealer can borrow the entire $500,000. The dealer writing the $100,000 check has a very real opportunity cost. That money could have been used to hire technicians, build service pays, reduce debt, advertise, make another acquisition, or simply remain in cash. That dealer has to decide whether another motor home sitting on the lot represents the best use of its capital. The dealer financing 100% of the purchase price faces a very different decision.
Its initial cash investment is zero. If the dealer believes there is even a reasonable chance the motor home will sell before carrying costs become burdensome. Accepting another unit appears economically rational. That is important enough to state another way. Wholesale demand is not the same thing as retail demand. A manufacturer shipping a motor home to a dealer has generated a sale. The manufacturer recognizes revenue, reduces finished goods inventory, collects cash from the dealer’s floor plan lender, and creates room for continued production.
None of those events requires a retail customer to exist. The dealer’s purchasing power therefore becomes an important source of apparent demand to the manufacturer. Even though that purchasing power is itself heavily influenced by the availability of bank credit. Now we have a feedback loop. This is why I believe dealers have effectively rented their balance sheets to manufacturers for decades. The dealer’s balance sheet provides the borrowing capacity that allows the manufacturer to place another unit into the dealer channel.
The bank supplies the cash but the dealer supplies the borrowing base. Important question is whether the dealer has historically been compensated appropriately for allowing his balance sheet to be used that way. We’ll come back to that question because the answer becomes extraordinary once we compare the dealer’s gross profit margins, floor plan interest, operating expenses, inventory turns, and the actual risk now embedded in dealer inventories.
For the moment, I want to focus on what the arrangement does to the location of risk. The dealer still has plenty of risk. It pays floor plan interest. It pays operating expenses. It incurs depreciation. It has employees, facilities, advertising expenses, reconditioning expenses, delivery expenses, customer service obligations, and eventually curtailments. The dealer certainly does not have a free ride. But the dealer did not provide any of the capital for its inventory.
The bank did 100%. And for two years, the manufacturer stands behind that inventory through its repurchase agreement. That means three different balance sheets participate in one motor home. The dealer has possession and operating risk. The bank supplies financial capital. The manufacturers received the cash and carries the contingent repurchase obligation. But take a closer look at the sequence. The manufacturer builds the motor home. The manufacturer creates the invoice and sends it to the dealer and to the bank.
The manufacturer issues the repurchase agreement. The manufacturer receives the cash. Then the manufacturer ships the motor home to the dealer. The dealer never wrote a check. The bank funded the manufacturer with the dealer’s floor plan line of credit. That is how much of the structure sits with the party that wants another wholesale shipment. And all before a retail purchaser is shown up to create actual demand. This is the misalignment of incentive.
This is the moral hazard in a nutshell. All three participants benefit immediately from another motor home shipment. The consequences of the risk don’t arrive until later. That is the architecture I have never been comfortable with since becoming a dealer. When the capital required to acquire inventory is removed from the dealer’s purchasing decision, the normal discipline imposed by capital weakens. Banks lend more. Dealers can borrow more and order more.
Manufacturers can ship more. Every participant can be behaving rationally according to the incentives immediately in front of them while the system as a whole produces an increasingly irrational amount of inventory. That distinction is central to everything that follows because I’m not suggesting manufacturers, dealers, or banks wake up each morning intending to damage themselves along with the people who purchase their motor homes from them. Quite the opposite.
I believe most participants are making rational decisions according to the incentives the industry has created for them. But every industry eventually gets the behavior its financial incentives reward. If those incentives reward motor home shipments before retail demand exists, then we should expect inventory to accumulate in the system. If that thesis is correct, there should be evidence. The most obvious place to look for that evidence is sitting on dealers lots.
Chapter 5 – The First Piece of Evidence
When retail demand declines, production should eventually decline with it. When inventory accumulates, manufacturers should reduce production until retail demand catches up. When inventory becomes scarce, production should increase. That is how a functioning feedback loop is supposed to work. The question is whether that feedback loop has worked in the motor home industry or whether something in the structure has overpowered it. To answer it, we went back as far as we could reconstruct shipments and retail registration data.
We started in 2003. That is as far back as we had RVIA shipments and statistical surveys, Inc. or SSI for short, retail registrations. I set the clock at zero on January 1st, 2003. Whatever was already sitting on dealers lots on December 31st, 2002 is not in this number. If beginning inventory was anything more than zero, then the overhang is larger than I am showing. For every year, we compared the number of new motor homes manufacturers shipped into the dealer channel as reported by the RVIA with the number of retail registrations with all 50 states departments of motor vehicles as reported by SSI.
The difference between the two is inventory overhang. If a manufacturer ships 50,000 motor homes and retail customers purchase 45,000 of them, the channel has accumulated 5,000 additional motor homes of inventory. If manufacturers ship 40,000 the following year and consumers purchase 42,000, the channel works off 2,000 of that overhead. That second part is critical. I’m not criticizing manufacturers merely because shipments exceeded retail sales during an individual year.
That will happen. What matters is whether the imbalance subsequently corrects. And when we accumulate those differences over time, the pattern became impossible to ignore or dismiss. And here’s the number I want you to focus on. As of June 30th, 2026, our analysis shows a cumulative motor home inventory overhang of 44,078 motor homes based upon trailing 12 months retail registrations of 31,629 motor homes.
That represents 16.72 months of supply. Retail registrations have been dropping for 5 1/2 years. The next 12 months will very likely come in below trailing 12. Before we go any further, I would like to address a couple of objections so no one has attempted to dismiss either the size of the overhang or the problem it has created. The first is Canada. I’ve heard it for years. Those shipment numbers include Canada. No, they do not. RVIA’s published US motor home shipment totals already exclude shipments into Canada.
The report says so on their face. Canadian shipments are removed from the monthly totals and from the year-to-ate totals. However, SSI counts every motor home registered within any state’s DMV in the US, including any Canadianbuilt motor homes that get titled in the US. That pairing cannot inflate the overhang. It works the other way. Canadianbound motor homes come out of RVIA shipments or the supply while Canadian built motor homes registered in the United States are included in SSI’s registration numbers or the retail demand.
If anything, the 44,078 motor home overhang is understated for this cycle. The overproduction and growth in motor home inventory overhang began in calendar year 2021. For an order of magnitude, SSI shows 7,949 Canadianbuilt motor homes registered in the United States from 2021 through June 30th, 2026. That is 18% of the 44,78 motor home inventory overhang. No matter how you cut it, no scenario reduces the 44,78 motor home overhang.
Any scenario that puts Canadian shipments back into supply would only increase the overhang because those units would be registered in Canada. They do not change the registrations already ported by SSI in the US. The second objection is rentals. RVIA does not separately report how many motor homes manufacturers ship into commercial rental fleets and SSI does not publicly disclose whether rental fleets first registrations are included in or filtered out of its published retail registration total.
What we know is every new motor home put into service in the United States has to be titled and registered somewhere. SSI collects those state registration records monthly. That leaves two possibilities. If rental first registrations are inside of SSI’s retail number, the 31,629 motor home figure overstates true customer demand and the overhang is worse than what I am showing. If they are excluded, those motor homes were never counted as retail demand.
Either way, rentals do not reduce the 44,78 motor home gap. There’s also another reason I don’t subtract rental motor homes from the problem. Those motor homes come back. A rental motor home is not consumed. It spends a year or two in a fleet and then enters the used market. Its wholesale book value comes from the exact same wholesale book that prices the same model year new lot queen sitting on a dealer’s lot. Same model year, same book, two very different motor home.
One has been rented, accumulated mileage, and been driven by dozens of different people. The other spent those same two years sitting unused on a dealer’s lot. Now ask the buyer the only question that really matters. Which would you rather buy? Most buyers will prefer the unused lot queen or they will demand a materially lower price for the higher mileage rental. Either way, the rental motor home is still supply. It still has to find an ultimate owner.
And when it leaves the rental fleet, it competes directly with the aged new and used motor homes already in the market. So rental motor homes are not vanished demand. They are delayed supply. RVIA does not publish an official rental fleet shipment count. But based on the public fleet and replacement figures of the largest rental operators, which are overwhelmingly class C motor homes, commercial rental companies appear to take roughly 1 to 2,000 new motor homes per year in the United States in a normal year and perhaps somewhat more in a heavy replacement year.
Against roughly 36,000 motor home shipments in 2025 and approximately 39,000 at the current twirling 12 month rate, that is only a small fraction of total shipments. It does not begin to explain a 44,78 motor home cumulative overhang. The motor homes do not vaporize. They still have to be absorbed by the market. So we are right back where we started. The overhang is still 44,78 motor homes. Retail demand is still 31,629 motor homes a year and dropping.
I am using the cleanest pairing this industry has manufacturer shipments and 50 state DMV registration. I am not using a marketing website as the universe. RV Trader is where some dealers advertise. It is not a census of all that is for sale and certainly not for what inventory is in the channel. The shorter window matters for a different reason. Over 23 years, even a small annual discrepancy can compound. But when I start the clock on January 1st, 2021, and run it only to June 30th, 2026, the surplus is still 43,230 motor homes once Canadianbuilt units registered in the United States are removed.
That is not a 23-year accumulation of small errors. That is 5 1/2 years. However, the manufacturers report a different number. They say filled inventory is 19,53 motor homes. That figure and the 43,230 motor home figure cannot both be right. One of them is wrong. Under the bylaws, the RVIA adopted in 2024. The board that governs what gets reported as a shipment is structured this way. 18 seats. The majority of them are held by the same parties who are reporting the lower number.
I am not going to resolve which number is right inside this video. I am going to use the one that is the purest pairing available and the one that is already the lowest conservative figure I can defend. Shipments out minus registrations in. That number is 44,078 units. And everything that follows in this video is built on that number. The 44,78 motor home inventory overhang is the number I’m going to use for the rest of this video because I believe it is the lowest conservative number possible.
It is certainly not the ceiling. For example, add back the Canadianbuilt motor homes titled in the US since 2021 and the overhang becomes 52,27 motor homes. The number would get even larger if we go back further than 2021 and account for all Canadianbuilt motor homes registered in the US. Then assume dealers had at least as many motor homes on their lots on December 31st, 2002 as the surplus we measured in 2003 and the overhang grows to 57,081 motor homes.
Reynolds do not cut that number. If they are counted by SSI because they were registered somewhere in the United States and received a license plate, consumer demand is smaller than 31,629 motor homes sold. And the months of supply gets even worse. I am using 44,78 motor home inventory overhang simply because I can defend every unit in it. Everything else we can see that we’ve left out runs in the same direction, a larger overhang.
So the 44,78 is conservative three different ways. We started the clock at zero in 2003. Canadian built motor homes titled in the United States raised SSI’s demand and did not raise RVIA US shipments. Reynolds do not make the gap smaller. Every one of those cuts runs the same direction. Think about what that means. If a motor home manufacturer stopped shipping new motor homes tomorrow and retail demand continued at its current rate, it would take almost 17 months for retail customers to absorb the existing overhang.
That is not a normal seasonal inventory fluctuation. That is a structural imbalance. And the historical comparison makes it even more revealing. In 2004, the first full year we started the clock, the cumulative overhang was 12,953 motor homes. And at the retail selling rate that year, that represented 2.44 months of supply. By 2017, the cumulative overhang had grown to 27,636 motor homes. That represented 5.74 months of supply.
Today we are at 44,078 motor homes and 16.72 months of supply. The number of motor homes matters, but months of supply tells us even more because inventory only has meaning relative to the rate at which customers are buying it. 40,000 motor homes of inventory in a market selling 40,000 motor homes every month is nothing. 40,000 motor homes in a market selling only 2 or 3,000 motor homes per month is an entirely different problem. That is why inventory turns and months of supply matter so much.
I wanted to stop here because I do not want anyone to misunderstand what I’m saying. Inventory is not inherently bad. Dealers need inventory. Customers want selection. A motor home is a highly considered purchase. Customers frequently want to see, touch, drive, and compare multiple products before spending hundreds of thousands of dollars. You cannot operate an RV dealership with an empty lot. As an Idaho farmer I knew put it, you can’t sell out of an empty wagon.
That is particularly true in the high-end motor home business. Customers spending several hundreds of thousands of dollars and sometimes more than a million dollars understandably have very specific preferences. floor plan, exterior paint, interior decor, cabinetry, furniture configuration, chassis, option, technology, and dozens of other choices. A dealer therefore needs enough inventory to provide a reasonable selection. Manufacturers need enough production flexibility to satisfy those preferences.
That is normal inventory. But there is a point at which selection becomes duplication. And there is a point at which customization becomes fragmentation. Suppose a manufacturer offers 10 floor plans, then multiple exterior color, multiple interior decors, different furniture arrangements, different chassis, different option combination. Does not take very many choices before hundreds of possible configurations exist. The dealer understandably wants enough inventory to represent those choices. that there is a mathematical problem hiding underneath all that selection.
Inventory is not demand. Building another configuration does not create another customer. If 100 customers exist, creating 200 configurations does not create 200 customers. It simply spreads those 100 customers across more inventory. That reduces inventory turns. And inventory returns is everything. When the inventory is depreciating and is financed with borrowed money, every dealer knows what eventually happens. A unit arrives that everyone believes will sell.
It looks great. The floor plan’s popular. Colors seem right. The options make sense. And then it sits. 90 days, 6 months, 9 months, a year. Another model year arrives. The dealer discounts it. Nothing. The manufacturer provides assistance. still nothing. Other similar units begin selling for less. The hotel book declines. Interest keeps acrewing. Eventually, that once beautiful motor home earns a less flattering name around the dealership. A lot queen.
Every dealer has them. The problem with a lot queen is not merely that it occupies physical space. It occupies capital. It consumes interest. It ages. It depreciates. And as the dealer becomes increasingly desperate to sell it, the price required to move the unit begins affecting the value of every similar motor home on the lot and in the market. That is where excess inventory stops being merely an accounting or dealer problem.
It becomes a customer’s problem. Imagine a new motor home originally carried a market price of $700,000. Enough similar inventory accumulates. Those units age. Manufacturers provide a system. dealers begin discounting. Eventually, the market clearing price for that motor home becomes $575,000. The customer who previously paid $700,000 does not own an asset worth $700,000 merely because that’s what the customer paid for it.
The next transaction establishes the market, which in turn impacts wholesale book value. If an equivalent new motor home can now be purchased for $575,000, the value of the existing motor home adjusts accordingly. The $125,000 was not lost because the motor home suddenly became less useful. It was lost because the market had to repric excess inventory to find another customer. That is how overprouction becomes excess depreciation. And excess depreciation is where the economics finally hit the motor homeowner.
The manufacturer may call the discount factory assistance. The dealer may call it aged inventory assistance. The bank may still carry a floor plan loan balance reflects far more than the motor home’s currently worth. The accounting system may recognize the loss at a different time, but the market does not care what anyone calls it. The market establishes the price and once the price of a new motor home falls, the value of comparable motor homes on the road or for sale have to adjust.
You cannot sustainably sell a used one-year old motor home for more than a heavily discounted one-year-old new motor home. The loss therefore migrates first into aged new inventory, then into nearly new used inventory, then further down the used market, and eventually out of the pocket of the person who actually owns the motor home, the customer. This is why I have spent so much time over the years talking about depreciation and cost of ownership.
Fuel is visible, insurance is visible, maintenance is visible, storage is visible, interest is visible. You receive bills for all of them. Depreciation is different. Nobody bails you a depreciation bill every month. You discover it when you trade your motor home or sell it. And on a high dollar motor home, excess depreciation dwarfs all other ownership expenses. Excess depreciation is always the elephant in the room. And that excess depreciation does not originate with the customer.
It originates upstream. It begins when more inventory enters the channel than retail demand can absorb at existing prices. Eventually, price has to clear the inventory. And when price clears the inventory, existing motor home owners discover what their motor homes are really worth. That is why I care so much about overproduction. Not because I dislike inventory. I’m a dealer. I need inventory. Not because manufacturers should somehow forecast demand perfectly.
Nobody can. I care because persistent excess production ultimately increases the cost of ownership for our customers, the people who pay my paycheck and my employees paycheck. And the historical data tells us something important. This is not simply one bad forecast. It is not one unusual year. It is not co. It is not one interest rate cycle. It is not one management team. It is not one election. And as we discussed in chapter 2, it cannot be credibly dismissed as a bullhip effect that somehow prevented the best informed participants in the industry from seeing inventory accumulate in their own channel.
The inventory overhang has been building across economic cycles and management teams for years and today it stands at the highest level in the historical series we have examined. 44,78 motor homes, 16.72 months of supply. That is the evidence. But evidence of excess inventory still does not tell us why rational businesses allowed it to accumulate. For that, we need to follow the money. We need to determine whether carrying all this inventory has actually been economically attractive for the dealer body.
Because if dealers have been adequately compensated for renting their balance sheets and their credit lines to the manufacturers, taking the inventory risk, paying the floor plan interest, and holding depreciating motor homes until a retail customer appears, then perhaps the system makes more economic sense than I believe it does. And if they have not been adequately compensated, then we have found something much more important than excess inventory.
We have found evidence of a capital allocation problem. That is where we’ll go next.
Chapter 6: The Evidence Speaks
In the last chapter, we looked at the first piece of evidence. Manufacturers have shipped more motor homes into the dealer channel than retail customers have taken out of it. In this chapter, I want to stay with those numbers because the more years we put on the same page, the harder it becomes to explain what happened as a series of unrelated forecasting mistakes or as the bullhip effect. We’re also going to take a closer look at the economics the current motor home inventory overhang has created.
The period since 2021 is particularly revealing because it lets us watch the deterioration happen almost in real time. Let’s start with an axiom we used here at NIRVC, which is every inventory turn produces a 2% gross profit. That 2% number is important. It’s not some margin assumption I invented for this video. It’s NIRVC’s historical blended results on more than 20,000 actual new motor home sales across a 12-year period. It includes both the winners and the losers of today’s and yesterday’s economics.
It includes motor homes sold profitably and the Lock Queens that eventually had to be sold at a loss. I am also not claiming every one of those 44,078 motor homes is on a dealer’s floor plan line this morning. I am asking what the overhang implies. If the channel is carrying 16.72 months of supply against 31,629 of retail registrations or sales, 2% a turn does not cover 5.89% floor plan interest. I use Camping World’s rate on purpose.
They are the largest dealer in the country, so they should be close to the lowest floor plan rate in the country. That 5.89% 89% is the applicable rate they reported at June 30th, 2026. It is 2.21% over sulfur, an acronym for secured overnight financing rate. I will use that same spread on the 22 1/2 year history in a minute. If Camping World’s money is too expensive at 72 turns, everybody paying a higher rate is in worse shape.
Look at what happened in 2021. The cumulative overhang represented 3.71 months of SSI registrations. Inventory was turning 3.24 times per year. At 2% gross profit per turn, that inventory generated 6.47% in annual new unit gross profit. For clarification, that’s front-end gross profit. That does not include what we refer to as FNI income. By the end of 2022, supply had exploded to 8.63 months. Turns had collapsed to 1.39.
By the end of 25, supply had reached 13.76 months and inventory was turning only.87 times per year. And now, as of June 30th, 2026, the cumulative overhang is 44,78 motor homes, equal to 16.72 months of supply and only.72 inventory turns per year. By the end of June 2026, the industry had reached inventory levels once thought unimaginable. A dealer earning 2% on an inventory turn does not simply need margin.
The dealer needs turns. 2% earned three or four times per year can support a business. 2% earned less than once per year cannot. And the June 2026 data gives us another piece of evidence that I find even more troubling. At the end of 2025, manufacturers had shipped 36,07 motor homes, while SSI recorded 33,554 retail registrations. By June 30th, 2026, manufacturers had increased their trailing 12-month shipments to 39,159 motor homes, while SSI recorded only 31,629 retail registrations.
Astoundingly, shipments are increasing while retail registrations are falling. That is not a correction. That is acceleration. This matters because we are no longer looking in an industry that merely failed to cut shipments quickly enough after a decline in demand. The rate of shipments is actually moving higher while retail registrations are moving lower. And that is where the cost of capital becomes incredibly important.
I do not need one magical percentage that every investor would accept. I only need a harder test. Did the gross profit generated by the inventory at least cover the interest required to finance it for decades? I don’t believe it did. History will show you. I went back through the entire inventory history beginning in 2004. Camping World and Lazy Days both historically used short-term floating rate benchmarks for their floor plan facilities.
During the liebore era, those facilities were generally priced at spreads clustered around two to two and a half percentage points over liebore. Today, Camping World’s reported applicable floor plan rate is 5.89%. That is 2.21% above the June 30th, 2026 sulfur rate of 3.68%. So, for consistency, I use the prevailing short-term benchmark plus 2.21% 21% across the historical period. One month liebore plus 2.21% during the liebore years and sulfur plus 2.21% after the industry transition to sulfur. Then I compared that estimated flooring rate with the gross profit generated by 2% per inventory return.
The history is revealing. The flooring rates shown here are not being represented as Camping World or Lazy Days actual historical borrowing rates in each individual year. They are a consistent analytical proxy using the prevailing short-term benchmark plus 2.21%. The first negative period occurred in 2006. Inventory was only 3.42 for two months of supply, but borrowing costs were high enough that the gross profit generated by the inventory failed to cover the flooring interest.
The same thing happened again in 2007. Then short-term interest rates collapsed during the Great Recession. By 2008, even though supply had increased to 4.27 months, the economics crossed back into positive territory because interest rates for flooring had fallen dramatically. It happened again in 2018. Inventory was 5.56 months of supply. Turns were only 2.16 times per year and the estimated flooring rate had risen enough that the economics went negative again.
Then rates declined in 2019 and the economics briefly recovered. The pandemic then effectively reset the entire system. By 2020, supply had collapsed only 1.97 months. Inventory turned 6.09 009 times per year. Short-term borrowing costs had collapsed and the spread became extraordinarily positive. Those earlier negative periods were warning. 2022 was the structural break. This time the problem was not merely the cost of money. The inventory overhang has become enormous.
Supply reached 8.63 months in 2022, 11.14 months in 2023, 12.07 07 months in 2024, 13.76 months in 2025, and 16.72 months as of June 30th, 2026. And notice something else. The estimated floor plan rate peaked at 7.59% in 2023 and has since fallen to 5.89%. Yet, the dealer economics have not recovered. Why? Because inventory turns deteriorated even faster than borrowing costs improved. The earlier episodes were rescued by falling rates.
Improving inventory turns or both. Since 2022, the inventory overhang has become large enough that lower borrowing costs have not been sufficient to restore positive economics. That is what makes the current environment different. There’s a simple way to see the same thing. 2% a turn, 12 months in a year. That is 24% of gross profit available in a year if inventory turned every month. Divide 24 by the floor plan rate and you get how many months of supply the dealer can carry before the interest eats the gross profit.
At today’s 5.89% floor plan rate, the break even inventory level is 4.07 07 months of supply and the actual inventory overhang is 16.72 months. The industry is carrying more than four times the new motor home inventory at 2% gross profit per turn can pay for at 5.89% flooring interest rates. And the Federal Reserve just raised short-term rates a quarter of a percent last week. All of that’s before the dealer has paid a salesperson, rent, insurance, advertising, delivery expense, or a single dollar of operating overhead.
The new inventory does not generate enough gross profit to even pay the interest expense required to finance it. That is not a forecasting problem. That is a capital structure problem. So if shipments are increasing while retail registrations are falling, inventory has reached 16.72 months of supply and the economics of carrying that inventory have remained negative for years. We have to come back to incentives.
The industry’s response to excess inventory has become remarkably predictable. Manufacturers provide assistance. Dealers discount. Retail prices fall. Aged units sell. Floor plan capacity becomes available. Dealers order replacement units. Manufacturers build again. I think of it as a pitch and catch. The manufacturer pitches inventory into the dealer channel. Eventually, the dealer becomes overstock.
The manufacturer and the dealer work together to clear the aged new motor homes through discounts, rebates, factory assistance, or some combination. The retail sale frees up floor plan capacity. Then, the dealer catches the next unit. The transaction solves today’s inventory problem while recreating tomorrow. That is why I conclude that the industry is not clearing inventory. Too often, it is only making room to build more. More precisely, the industry’s solution to excess inventory has too often been to create enough retail demand through lower prices to make room for the next round of excess production.
Motor home owners ultimately pay through excess depreciation. Dealers pay through compressed margins, floor plan interest, operating expenses, and curtailments. Manufacturers pay through discounts, rebates, assistance, and eventually the financial risk associated with the repurchase obligation. Banks carry increasing exposure to depreciating collateral. Nobody has to be making a foolish decision at the moment the decision is made.
The system simply keeps rewarding the next shipment. Every industry eventually gets the behavior its financial incentives reward. Once I understood that, the data stopped looking mysterious. The next question became unavoidable. When the economics stop working, where does the financial risk ultimately land?
Chapter 7: The Invisible Transfer of Risk
We have now followed the motor home from production into the dealership. We have seen who gets paid, who provides the capital, how the bank finances 100% of the manufacturer’s invoice on behalf of the dealer, and what happens to the inventory overhang in motor homes when wholesale shipments consistently outrun retail demand. We’ve also seen something else. The economics can deteriorate dramatically without any participant making an irrational decision at the moment that decision is made.
Now, I want us to change perspectives. Let’s think like a banker. When a loan stops performing, the lender eventually has to answer one question. How do I get my money back? That question creates what I think of as a repayment waterfall. A prudent lender begins with the clatter. What is it worth today? Not what the invoice was yesterday, not what the borrower carries it for on its balance sheet, not what somebody hopes it be worth 6 months from now.
What can I sell it for today? If the collateral is sufficient to repay the loan, the lender can be made whole. If it is not, the lender looks next to the borrower. Does the borrower have enough tangible net worth, cash or other financial capacity to cover the shortfall? And if the borrower cannot perform, the lender moves farther down the waterfall to guarantees and secondary sources of repayment. That is the framework I want us to use from this point forward.
Notice how different it is from the way the industry often discusses risk. The industry frequently begins with the existence of the manufacturer’s repurchase agreement and concludes the bank is protected. A banker should start at the other end. What is the collateral worth? How much actual net worth does the borrower have? What happens if the manufacturer is called upon to perform? and does the manufacturer have enough liquidity to perform if its obligation is no longer theoretical?
Those are very different questions. When I owned banks, we didn’t merely underwrite individual loans. We stress tested portfolios. We wanted to understand what would happen if 1% of our borrowers defaulted, then 2%, 5%, or 10%. We were not predicting those outcomes. We were asking whether the bank could withstand them if they occurred. The RV industry has spent decades operating under a structure in which the dealer is the legal borrower. The bank finances 100% of the manufacturers’s invoice on behalf of the dealer and the manufacturer provides the 2-year repurchase commitment.
That obviously means the borrower, the holder of the collateral, the source of capital, and the contingent backs stop are not all the same entity. Risk has separated from the decision that originally created it. That is the invisible transfer of risk. So let’s move down that repayment waterfall in order. First, the collateral and the borrower. Then the manufacturer. And only after we understand all three will we know how secure the lender really is. and by extension how healthy or unhealthy the dealers and the manufacturers are.
Chapter 8: What Happens When a Borrower Can’t Perform?
The waterfall of collecting a loan begins with one simple question. What is the collateral worth? In all the years I owned banks, we never collected $1 from a guarantee. Not once. Borrower litigation and bankruptcies always prevented us from realizing anything from the guarantee. Whatever recovery we ultimately received on our loans came from the collateral itself and whatever equity the borrower had in that collateral above our outstanding loan balance, including acred and unpaid interest.
My banking experience permanently shaped the way I think about guarantees. They may look comforting on paper, but whenever a borrower defaulted on a loan, whether it was a monetary or non-monetary default, the first thing I wanted to know was the market value of our collateral and whether it was sufficient to repay our loan in full. Before a prudent lender places reliance on guarantees or other secondary sources of repayment, lender begins with the collateral, the borrower’s equity, and that collateral.
With that in mind, let’s test the dealer body. As we established in chapter 3, the bank finances 100% of the manufacturer’s invoice on behalf of the dealer. The manufacturer receives the cash. The dealer receives the motor home, and the dealer owes the bank. The dealer possesses the inventory, but none of the capital required to purchase that inventory from the manufacturer came from the dealer. Prior to becoming an RV dealer, I had never seen or even heard of assetback lending, real estate lending, or virtually any other form of secured lending where the borrowers permitted to finance 100% of the acquisition cost with no equity contribution as the standard course of action.
Then I entered the RV industry. As we saw in chapter six, there have been periods when gross profit generated by new inventory failed to cover even the estimated interest expense required to finance it. What makes the current environment different is its persistence and its scale. Since 2022, the economics have remained negative while inventory supply has grown from 8.63 months to 16.72 months. Today, the overhang is 16.72 months of supply.
That is.72 turns. 2% a turn is 1.44% a year. As you recall, Camping World’s floor plan rate at June 30th, 2026 was 5.89%. 1.44% gross profit does not cover 5.89% flooring interest. That is the same 4.45% we measured in chapter 6. And that’s before a salesperson rent or a light bill. dealers are renting their balance sheets and credit lines to manufacture and losing 4.45% a year doing it. That is why I do not believe the dealer body represents the financial backs stop many assume it does.
This is not a question of whether dealers want to honor their obligations. It’s a question of whether they possess the financial capacity to absorb the losses already sitting in their inventory plus the ongoing 4.45% floor plan interest. So, let’s value the collateral. I’m not claiming every one of those 44,78 motor homes is on dealer’s floor plan line today. I am asking what the overhang implies in dollars. To estimate those dollars, we calculated a weighted average new motor home invoice across class A, B, C, and super C.
The class averages come from the invoices of NIRVC’s new motor home inventory. Each average is weighted by that class’s market share of the motor home market for the trailing 12 months of retail sold registrations as reported by SSI. The weighted average invoice of 204,561 multiplied by the overhang of 44,78 motor homes equals $9.017 billion of total implied invoice values in the overhang. Now, let’s market to market.
To establish the model year mix, we use the actual inventories of the 10 largest motor home dealers in the United States in the data set for this analysis. Together, those dealers represent approximately 59.52% of the observed motor home inventory population. We stratified that inventory by model year and applied the mix to 44,078 motor homes. For a consistent depreciation proxy, we used actual wholesale book values on a 2027 class A diesel motor home for the 2023 through 2026 model years against the invoice on that same 2027 class A diesel motor home.
We applied those percentages to the 204,561 weighted average invoice and to the model year mix of the overhang. One number deserves special attention. The 2026 inventory is already 20% off current invoice. There are 23,493 of those motor homes. That is 53.3% of the entire motor home inventory overhang. The 2025s are 27.3% off. That is the older year and the older year is worse. Age is doing what age is supposed to do on that pair.
What is not normal is the 20 points off last year’s model year with more than half the overhang sitting in that one year alone. Price follows supply. How many are for sale? 42,359 of the 44,078 overhang motor homes are 26s and 27s. That is 96.1%. There are plenty to choose from. So those years have gotten cheap. That loss already exists whether anyone recognizes it today or not.
Nobody has to declare it. Nobody has to vote on it. Nobody has to agree on it. The market has already created it. This overhang does not vanish tomorrow. The 44,078 motor homes are 16.72 months of supply at today’s 31,629, trailing 12 month retail rate. If that stock ran off evenly, the average dollar would still be on the floor plan line for 8.36 months. That 16.72 months only works if not one additional motor home enters the overhang while it is being sold.
Shipments into the dealer channel would have to stop until those 44,78 motor homes are gone. If manufacturers keep shipping, the clock gets longer and the interest and future book value hits get worse. The bank does not wait. The floor plan interest rate is 5.89% 89% a year on 9.017 billion. That is 370 million of flooring interest before the overhang is gone. Ship more coaches and that number gets worse.
Separate from the interest is the loss already embedded in the overhang. Today that is 11.76% $1.06 billion. That 1.06 06 billion is how far today’s wholesale books sits below a current invoice on that same mix. It is a mark tomarket against today’s invoice, not a VIN by VIN replay of every original floor plan advance. That $1.06 billion embedded loss is based on today’s wholesale book value against the 2027 invoice.
But that’s not the end loss. A new wholesale book value comes out every 60 days. During those 8.36 months, there will be four more book changes. Each one can and most likely will take more off whatever has not sold. Let me illustrate what that looks like on one coach. A 2022 Fleetwood Discovery 44S wholesale book value was $33,450 in March of 2022. By March of 2026, it was $198,550. A $14,900 of depreciation, a compounded 10.06% a year.
Four book changes is 2/3 of the six book changes that take place in one year. 2/3 of that 10.06% is 6.7%. 6.7% of the $7.957 billion the collateral is worth today is $533 million. Now let’s add the three up. 1.06 billion already embedded plus 370 million of additional flooring interest to clear the overhang plus 533 million more in depreciation. That is $1.963 billion to work this overhang off. If those 44,078 motor homes clear evenly over 16.72 months, not one additional motor home enters the overhang and book values continue to do what they have done to that discovery. manufacturer shutting down production for 16.72 months is not realistic.
Which means the interest and future book change hits on those 44,078 motor homes will certainly be larger than the 1.963 billion I am illustrating. I am not even going to begin to speculate on an industrywide tangible equity figure for a dealer body that’s almost entirely private. camping world we can see. The rest we cannot. What we can measure is the whole $1.963 billion dollars to work the motor home overhang off as it exists today under the assumptions we’ve just walked through.
That is what the next names in the collection waterfall will have to be large enough to fill. And the problem is larger still. Everything we’ve measured directly so far is motor homes. Motor homes are about 40% of the RV market by sales dollars. Travel trailers and fifth wheels are about 60%. Using that dollar mix, 9.017 billion of motor home inventory overhang scales to about 22.54 billion of implied new RV inventory at their original invoice amounts.
The same workoff relationship of losses we just measured on motor homes $1.963 billion on 9.017 billion would be about $4.91 billion across that broader new RV inventory overhang. I want to be precise. We measured the motor home overhang. We did not independently mark every travel trailer and fifth wheel on every lot. Sales dollar mix is not inventory mix. Tobables do not turn like motor homes. Given the acres of trailers we’ve all seen covering dealers lots as we drive by them, the extrapolation may prove to be light.
It is scale. It is not a census. And those losses are not evenly distributed. The 10 largest motor home dealers represent about 60% of the inventory sample we use to mark to market the new motor home inventory overhang. That is concentration risk. As I used to tell our loan committee, if a borrower owed us $50,000 and can’t pay, he has a problem. If he owes us $50 million and can’t pay, we have a problem. The same principle applies here.
We have only marked new inventory. We have not marked the dealer bodies used motor homes, travel trailers, or fifth wheels. I didn’t use RV Trader to measure the 44,078 motor homes. I already told you why. I am going to use what is currently advertised on RV Trader to get an idea of the mix between new and used inventory. Again, this is not a census. Not every dealer lists there, and dealers do not pay to advertise every identical unit, but it should get us in the ballpark of the mix.
We have not marked about 41% of that advertised mix. There is no reason used inventory escapes depreciation. I do not know how large the embedded loss is. I know it’s not zero. The manufacturers have already received its money. The bank has a 2-year repurchase commitment from the manufacturer standing behind qualifying new inventory. The dealer is the one staring at the book every 60 days, paying the interest and absorbing the carrying costs and eventually funding the curtailments.
When a dealer cannot afford to recognize the loss sitting in aged new inventory, the loss does not disappear. Sometimes it moves. Accounting can change where a loss appears. Cannot eliminate the loss itself. Understanding where those losses migrate is the next piece of the puzzle. At the end of the last chapter, we measured the whole $1.963 billion dollar of losses currently
Chapter 9: The Losses Don’t Disappear
embedded in the motor home inventory overhang. And that is before used inventory. The next question almost asks itself, if the dealer cannot afford to recognize the loss, what happens to it? In the RV industry, there is no lack of motivation for a dealer to want to move an inventory loss. And one of the easiest places to move a loss from an aged new inventory is into used inventory. The mechanics are simple.
A dealer has an aging new motor home that has been sitting too long. Floor plan interest is mounting. The next model year or two is already out. Curtailments are looming or have already started. and the dealer needs to create room on its flooring line to purchase current model year motor homes that still have the potential to generate a profit. The customer walks in with a used motor home to trade.
The dealer wants and needs to sell the aging new motor home cannot afford to miss that opportunity and therefore focuses the customer on one number above all others. How much the dealer will allow or will pay for the customer’s trade. We haven’t discussed curtailment payments yet and they are the third leg of what I call the dealer’s triple whammy. The first whammy is floor plan interest. The second is depreciation as new model years and new wholesale book values arrive.
The third is mandatory curtailment payments. Curtailment payments are mandatory principal payments a dealer must make to its bank on unsold aged new inventory. As long as the motor home is fresh, the bank is content collecting interest monthly. Once the unit reaches a specified age, commonly between 270 days and 365 days, depending on the lender and the dealer, the bank requires the dealer to begin paying down principal even though the unit has not sold.
Those monthly curtailments typically range from roughly 2.5% to 10% of the outstanding principal. That is how aged inventory can destroy a dealer’s cash flow. The dealer is paying interest plus principal on a motor home that has generated no revenue while the collateral itself continues declining in value. Let’s walk through an illustrative transaction using round numbers so you can see exactly how the economics work. Suppose a customer owns a used motor home with a wholesale book value of $200,000 and is looking to purchase an aged new motor home that invoiced for $600,000 when the dealer purchased it from the manufacturer 2 years ago.
The current model year is 2027. Two years back is an aged new 2025 motor home. Before the transaction, the dealer owns the aged new motor home for $600,000 and owes its floor plan bank $600,000. Based upon the depreciation data we reviewed in chapter 8, that 2025 motor home is worth 27.3% less than its original invoice. on $600,000. That is a wholesale book value of $436,200 and an embedded inventory loss of $163,800. In addition, the dealer is paying $3,000 per month in floor plan interest at a 6% annual rate.
And assuming curtailments are starting at only a two and a half% per month, which is on the lower end of curtailments, another $15,000 per month in mandatory principal payments. The dealer is therefore writing checks totaling $18,000 every month on a motor home that is generating no revenue and continues declining in value. In my last video, the secrets behind what’s driving up the cost of ownership, I devoted a chapter titled, “What is overall allowance?
A real slick operation?” showing how overall allowances work. For purposes of this illustration, we will assume the purchaser is financing and the lender’s underwriting guidelines will not allow the purchaser to finance more than 120% of the dealer’s original invoice amount. Now, let’s separate the transaction into two completely different pieces so you can see what’s happening. The first transaction is the customer’s purchase of the new aged 2025 motor home.
The dealer sells the 2-year-old, but still technically new motor home for $800,000. The purchaser makes an $80,000 cash down payment and finances the remaining $720,000. The dealer receives the full $800,000 purchase price in cash. Dealer immediately uses $600,000 to pay off the floor plan loan. That leaves the dealer with $200,000 in cash and $200,000 reported gross profit on the new motor home.
Now comes the second transaction, the customer’s used motor home. The dealer agrees to purchase the trade for $400,000 even though its wholesale book value is only $200,000. The dealer uses the $200,000 remaining from the new motor home sale and borrows another $200,000 on a used inventory floor plan. Why would anyone pay $800,000 for a motor home the dealer purchased for $600,000 two years ago? There are several reasons.
The purchaser doesn’t know the dealer’s invoice. The purchaser sees a $930,000 MSRP, views an $800,000 selling price as a 14% discount off MSRP. Based on his automobile purchasing experiences, 14% discount from MSRP may appear to be a fair or even good deal. That number looks even better when the dealer offers the customer $400,000 for a trade. and purchaser probably doesn’t know the 2-year-old new motor home he is purchasing has a current wholesale book value of only $436,200. But he does know the $400,000 the dealer is giving him for his trade may be very close to what he originally paid for the motor home when he purchased it new.
So that side of the transaction appears to be a great deal. The dealer, however, has enormous motivation to make the transaction. It books a $200,000 gross profit. It eliminates $600,000 floor plan loan. It replaces that debt with only $200,000 of used floor plan debt. It frees up $400,000 of floor plan capacity. It reduces monthly interest payments from $3,000 to $1,000 per month. and it eliminates the $15,000 monthly curtailment on that lock queen. The lock queen is gone.
The old floor plan loan is paid off. The dealer’s monthly cash flow drain falls by $17,000. $400,000 of floor plan capacity has been freed. The dealer can now purchase a current model year motor home with the potential to make a profit. The manufacturer receives another order. Everyone temporarily feels better, but the economics have not improved by a single dollar. The dealer did not create $200,000 of economic value simply because it reported $200,000 of gross profit on the sale of the new motor home.
At exactly the same time, it paid $400,000 for a used motor home worth only $200,000. The loss has not disappeared. It has simply changed parking spaces. Remember, in this illustration, we assumed the purchaser was financing the aged new motor home and therefore benefited from protective guard rails imposed by the bank’s underwriting guidelines. For example, the lender limited the amount it would finance to 120% of the dealer’s invoice.
Had the purchaser paid cash, that guardrail would not have existed. The dealer could have sold the new motor home at an even higher price and overall allowed on the trade by a corresponding amount, allowing the dealer to book an even larger gross profit while moving an even larger loss into used inventory. And cash purchases are hardly unusual in high-end motor homes. During the trailing 12 months, 48.9% of all new and used class A, B, C, and super C’s motor homes sold by NIRVC were purchased with cash.
Among class A diesel motor homes, that figure was 72%. My point is simple. There are ample opportunities and powerful incentives for dealers to create accounting profits while moving economic losses. Accounting determines where and when a gain or a loss is recognized. Economics determine whether the gain or loss actually exists. A dealer can create an accounting profit on one motor home while simultaneously moving an equal economic loss into another motor home, but it cannot make the loss disappear. Eventually, the used motor home has to be sold.
And when it was sold, the market reveals what it was worth all along. I want to be careful here because overallowing on a trade is not by itself improper. Dealers in many industries use trade allowances as a part of normal retail negotiations. The problem begins when inflated trade allowances become a recurring mechanism for transferring losses out of aged new inventory and warehousing those losses in used inventory that is not being marked to market.
Once that happens repeatedly, a dealer’s used inventory can become a storage facility for yesterday’s losses. This is why carrying value and market value matter so much. When I own banks, we care deeply about the current market value because market value is what ultimately repaid our loan. A lender cannot foreclose on an invoice. A lender cannot foreclose on a book value. A lender cannot liquidate an accounting entry. If a borrower fails, the lender receives whatever the collateral will actually bring in the market.
Yet, the RV industry largely continues to look at dealer inventory through manufacturer invoices for new inventory and accounting carrying values for used inventory rather than current market values for both. See no evil, hear no evil. The gap between carrying values and market value is where losses hide. And the larger the inventory overhang becomes, the more dangerous that gap becomes. The analysts in our loan department marked the new inventory and used inventory of the dealers we floor plan to market every 60 days when the new wholesale book values were released. The purpose was not to create a loss. The purpose was to reveal a loss that already existed.
We have only marked the new inventory to market. Chapter 8 already showed that about 40% of what is advertised on RV trader is used and we have not marked that to market but we know those losses are not zero. The hole is larger than the new overhang we can see. The motivation comes from the confluence of the inventory overhang, declining market values, floor plan interest carry, curtailments, and the opportunity cost of having capital and floor plan capacity trapped in aged new inventory.
Together, those pressures create a powerful incentive to book gains on the new unit and move the underlying economic loss elsewhere. Overall allowance is simply the vehicle that transports the loss from aged new inventory into used inventory. Now we are ready to move one step further down the repayment waterfall. If the collateral can’t make the bank hold and the dealer cannot perform, the lender eventually reaches the manufacturer and its two-year repurchase agreement.
The next question is, can the manufacturers perform? Now we’ll move down the repayment waterfall to the manufacturer. At first glance, that sounds comforting. That is precisely why manufacturers sign
Chapter 10: Can the Manufacturers Perform?
repurchase agreements with floor plan lenders. If a dealer defaults while inventory remains subject to the agreement, the manufacturer stands behind that inventory according to the terms of its repurchase commitment. But guarantees are easiest admired when no one is asking the guarantor to perform. If someone guarantees a $10 million obligation but does not possess $10 million of financial capacity, the guarantee may be perfectly valid legally while being far less comforting economically.
The relevant question is not simply did they guarantee it. The relevant question is can they actually write the check? And there is the second question that matters just as much. What happens to their balance sheet after they write the check? That is how I believe lenders should think about manufacturer repurchase obligations. If I were underwriting those manufacturers, I would want to know five things. What is the amount of their contingent repurchase liabilities?
How much cash do they have? How much additional liquidity can they access? How much loss can their shareholders equity absorb? And what happens to their debt agreements if a significant repurchase event consumes liquidity, reduces earnings, impairs equity, or weakens their borrowing capacity? Then I would stress test the answers. Let’s start with the two largest publicly traded RV manufacturers because their financial statements allow us to see the structure in actual numbers.
And I want to look at them separately. They face the same type of contingent obligation. They do not face it from equal financial positions. As of April 30th, 2026, Thor reported 3.719 billion dollars of standby repurchase obligations related to their dealer inventory financing. Thor’s associated repurchase and guarantee loss reserve was $19,268,000. Four also reported $371,946,000 of cash and cash equivalents, approximately $998 million of unused availability under its revolving assetbased credit facility, approximately 1.196 billion of net working capital, and approximately $4.312 billion of shareholders equity. Thor generated approximately $133,300,000 of consolidated net income during the first nine months of fiscal 2026.
Thor’s filings say its repurchase commitments generally run up to 18 months. Thor is not without resources, but $3.719 billion is still an enormous contingent exposure. And remember what Thor’s $19,270,000 reserve means. It is not $19,270,000 sitting in a segregated account waiting to pay repurchase claim. It is an accounting estimate of losses associated with the guarantee. Thor says the estimate is based on recent historical loss experience supplemented by management’s assessment of current economic and dealer conditions.
Thor also says its repurchase losses during the latest reporting periods were not material. That historical loss experience is going to become extremely important later in this chapter. Thor also reports approximately $998 million of unused availability under its assetbased lending facility or ABL for short. That is a real source of liquidity, but it is not cash. Cash is cash. A credit line is debt waiting to be borrowed. Every dollar drawn becomes additional debt and reduces borrowing capacity remaining.
I will not keep revisiting that distinction throughout the chapter for both manufacturers. I will show the AL because it is a legitimate source of liquidity, but I will not pretend unused debt capacity is the same thing as cash or equity. Now look at Winnebago. As of May 30th, 2026, Winnebago reported approximately $1.778 billion of contingent repurchase exposure and only $1.3 million acred for potential repurchase losses.
Wnebago had 57,100,000 of cash and cash equivalents. no borrowings against its $350 million assetbased lending facility, $411,600,000 of working capital, $442,900,000 of long-term debt, and $1.234 billion of shareholders equity. For the first nine months of fiscal 2026, Winnebago reported $24,800,000 of net income. Its repurchase agreements generally can run up to 24 months. That is a different financial profile. Winnebago’s contingent repurchase exposure is more than 31 times its cash balance.
Now, to be fair, Winnebago states that it believes its cash flow from operations, existing credit lines, and access to debt and capital markets are sufficient for its current liquidity needs. It had no borrowings against its AL on May 30th, 2026. I am not saying when a baggo cannot meet its ordinary operating obligations. I am asking an entirely different question. What happens if a contingent liability that normally sits quietly in a footnote suddenly becomes a cash demand?
That is what a stress test is designed to answer. There is an important detail about these repurchase agreements I want to address before we stress test these numbers. Contractually, the repurchase obligations on an individual motor home can decline as that motor home ages. Curtailments are supposed to reduce the dealer’s floor plan balance over time, and the manufacturers’s repurchase obligation can step down with it. Winnebago states explicitly that it repurchase liability is generally the lesser of the dealer’s remaining principal or dealer invoice less periodic contractual reductions based on the amount of time since the original invoice.
Importantly, Winnebago also tells us that the contingent liability it reports is already net of the greater of those contractual reductions or dealer principal payments. Thor likewise describes predefined curtailment arrangements in determining the repurchase price under its agreements. So I’m not assuming these manufacturers remain obligated for 100% of the original dealer invoice forever. There is a very large difference between how the obligation on one individual VIN is designed to decline and what is actually happening to the aggregate exposure across the dealer channel.
Start with the inventory. As of June 30th, 2026, 25,212 motor homes in the overhang were model year 2026 or older. That is 57.2% of the entire 44,078 motor homes in inventory overhang. But here is the more important number. Those 25,212 aged motor homes equal 79.7% of an entire year of current motor home retail sales. At today’s trailing 12-month retail rate of 31,629 motor homes, even if every single motor home purchaser bought only a model year 2026 or older motor home and nobody purchased a 2027 motor home, it would still take approximately 9.6 months just to clear that aged inventory.
Of course, that is not what happens. Customers continue buying 2027s. Manufacturers continue producing 2027s. And while the industry is trying to work through yesterday’s inventory, today’s inventory keeps getting older. Then the next model year arrives. That is how the snowball rolls forward. And there is another practical reality that matters. When an age motor home reaches a contractual curtailment and the dealer does not have the liquidity to make the required principal payment without creating a serious cash problem, the dealer can ask its bank for forbearance.
Now, put yourself in the bank’s position. You can rigidly enforce the curtailment against a dealer that may not possess the cash to make it. Or you can give the dealer the additional time while asking the manufacturer to extend its repurchase protection so your secondary source of repayment remains in place. Which one’s easier? If every curtailment were rigorously enforced regardless of the dealer’s ability to pay, I believe we would have already seen dramatically more dealer failures. So the dealer asks for time.
The bank has an incentive to grant it. The bank has an incentive to preserve its secondary source of repayment. The manufacturer has an incentive to extend that protection rather than force an immediate dealer failure and trigger the very repurchase obligation everybody is trying to avoid. The dealer gets more time. The bank preserves its backs stop. The manufacturer avoids an immediate repurchase. Everyone has individually made a rational decision and the inventory remains.
The curtailment was supposed to impose discipline. Forebearance can postpone that discipline. And notice what happens while everybody is granting more time. Older inventory remains in the system. New inventory enters a fresh repurchase window and another model year arrives and the aggregate exposure keeps rolling forward. There is another piece of evidence that tells us why looking at only contractual stepdowns can be misleading.
The motor home inventory overhang essentially doubled in 2022 from 15,350 motor homes at the end of 2021 to 30,863 motor homes at the end of 2022. That was also the period when reported manufacturer repurchase exposures increased dramatically. Wnebago’s reported contingent repurchase liability increased from $552 million in 2021 to 1.784 billion in 2022. Now remember, Winnebago tells us explicitly that its reported contingent liability is already net of greater of contractual periodic reductions or dealer principal payments.
So what happened over the next four years? The exposure did not melt away. It was 1.817 billion in 2023, $1.674 billion in 2024, $1.64 billion in 2025, and by May of 2026, it was back to $1.778 billion. Four years have passed since the inventory problem exploded in 2022. Contractual reductions have occurred. Principal payments have occurred. Inventory sold.
Individual units aged through the repurchase period. Yet, Winnebago’s reported contingent exposure is almost exactly where it stood in 2022. Thor tells a similar broader story. Thor’s reported standby repurchase obligations increased from $1.821 821 billion in 2021 to $4309 billion in 2022. By April 2026, after years of inventory sales, contractual aging, and units moving through an agreement that generally runs only about 18 months, Thor’s reported standby repurchase obligations still stood at $3.719 billion.
One methodological difference matters here. Winnebago’s reported contingent liability is already net of contractual reductions or dealer principal payments. Thor’s reported standby repurchase obligations are not presented on exactly the same net basis. Thor is historically disclosed that it standby total does not reflect curtailments that may reduce the eventual repurchase obligation. So the two histories are directionally informative but they are not directly comparable dollar for dollar.
That tells us something important. The VINs roll off. The aggregate exposure keeps rolling forward. I cannot prove from the manufacturer’s public filings how much of that persistent exposure is attributable specifically to dealer forbearance or extension of manufacturer repurchase protection. The manufacturers do not disclose that. But the reported numbers tell us what did not happen. Four years of contractual stepdowns did not materially eliminate the aggregate exposure.
If curtailments and contractual rolloffs were imposing enough discipline to solve the underlying inventory problem, we should have expected the aggregate exposure to decline substantially as older inventory worked through the system. It did not. The reason should not surprise us. The industry is trying to clear yesterday’s inventory while continuing to manufacture today’s inventory. Old obligations mature. New obligations replace them.
Aged inventory receives more time when the alternative is potentially forcing a dealer failure. New inventory enters the repurchase window and the snowball rolls forward. The individual obligation may mature. The system keeps refinancing the problem. That is the pitch and catch. The mechanism that was supposed to force inventory discipline can instead help extend the period before the economic loss has to be recognized.
Credit can extend the period and clearly it has but it cannot make the inventory disappear. Before we stress test either manufacturer, we need to separate two risks that are easy to confuse. Grocery purchase exposure is a liquidity risk. The embedded marktomarket loss in any repurchased inventory is an earnings and capital risk. They are not the same thing. Suppose a manufacturer has to provide $100 million to satisfy repurchase obligations.
It does not necessarily lose $100 million. It spends $100 million of liquidity and receives inventory back. The 11.76% figure is the blended average on the entire 44,078 motor home overhang. Almost 43% of those units are current model year 2027s that still carry zero embedded loss. Strip those out and the remaining 25,212 motor homes, model year 2026 and older, carry the entire 1.06 06 billion of loss on their invoice value.
That is a 20.55% embedded loss rate. Manufacturers repurchase agreements do not sit on the entire overhang. They sit on the units still inside the contractual window or on units that have been kept inside that window through forbearance. A repurchase is called when a dealer cannot perform. That dealer’s inventory is the aged inventory. The inventory that comes back is not the average of the whole overhang.
It is the inventory that has already taken the 20.55% and higher hits. Applying the blended 11.76% average to Thors and Winnebago’s reported repurchase exposure understates the economic impairment on the inventory those agreements actually cover. For the stress tests that follow, I am using the 20.55% rate measured on the model year 2026 and older inventory. That is the rate that applies to the units most likely to be inside or extended into the repurchase window.
I am only using the impairment embedded in the collateral today. I am not adding another year or two of future depreciation to the manufacturer stressed case using that rate. If the manufacturer provides 100 million and receives inventory back, that inventory is worth $79,450,000. The economic loss is $20,550,000. The manufacturer therefore faces two problems simultaneously. First, it has to come up with the $100 million of cash.
Second, $20,550,000 of loss has to be absorbed through earnings and ultimately shareholders equity when the inventory is marked or sold at market value. A manufacturer can survive the economic loss and still experience a liquidity crisis if too much cash is demanded too quickly. Conversely, it can have enough liquidity to complete the repurchase and still materially impair shareholders equity and potentially run into debt covenant restrictions as embedded losses are recognized.
That distinction is central to everything that follows. Let’s start with Thor’s 3.719 billion of disclosed contingent repurchase exposure. 1% of that exposure is $37.2 $2 million of cash. At 20.55%, the embedded loss is $7.6 million. 2% is 74.4 million of cash and $15.3 million of embedded loss. 5% is $186 million of cash and $ 38.2 million of embedded losses. 10% is $371.9 million of cash and $76.4 million of embedded loss.
Look at the 10% case. 10% of Thor’s disclosed repurchase exposure would require $371.9 million of cash. Coincidentally, Thor had $371.9 million of cash on April 30th, 2026. In other words, a 10% event would equal Thor’s entire cash balance, and it is not a theoretical percentage. Camping World alone already represents more than 20% of Thor’s repurchase exposure. On December 31st, 2025, Camping World said 58.4% of their $1.421 billion of new inventory was Thor.
That is $830 million. Thor’s repurchase exposure was 3.51 billion eight weeks earlier on October 31st, 2025 and 3.67 billion a month later on January 31st, 2026. One dealers inventory is more than 20% of Thor’s whole repurchase exposure. Thor is not insolvent in a 10% event. It has 998 million of unused ABL. That AL line is real. It is also debt. The minute they draw it, the cash goes out first, then they borrow. Then they recognize about $76.4 million of embedded loss at the 20.55% rate on the aged inventory that is actually coming back.
That is more than half of 9 months of net income. Cash, debt, earnings, and the credit agreement all move at once. That is the stress. Now, apply exactly the same analysis to Winnebago’s $1.778 billion of disclosed contingent exposure. 1% is 17.8 million of cash and $3.7 million of embedded losses. 2% is 35.6 million of cash and 7.3 million of embedded losses. 5% is 88.9 million of cash and $18.3 million of embedded loss. 10% is $177.8 million of cash and $36.5 million of embedded loss.
Now compare those numbers with Winnebago’s $57.1 million of cash. A 2% event requires $35.6 $6 million or more than 60% of Winnebago’s cash. A 5% event requires 88.9 million, already more cash than Winnebago had on hand. A 10% event requires $177.8 million, more than three times its cash balance. Wnebago generated $24.8 $8 million of net income during the first nine months of its fiscal 2026.
Our 10% stress case produces $36.5 million of embedded economic loss. That is larger than 9 months of current net income. Again, Wnebago has 350 million unused ABL facility. Cash plus the entire state at AL equals 47 million. That sounds substantial until you compare it with 1.778 billion of contingent repurchase exposure. And even that comparison is generous because it assumes Winnebago could devote every dollar of cash and every available borrowed dollar to repurchase while still paying employees, suppliers, warranty claims, capital expenditures, interest, taxes, and every other obligation required to continue operating the company.
Obviously, it cannot. That is why I believe Wnebago’s 31:1 exposure to cash ratio deserves more attention than it currently receives. A ratio does not mean anything until you look at what sits under it. Wnebago’s 1.778 billion is not a million separate risks on houses someone already bought. Is dealer inventory financing. There is no retail customer. That is why the RV is still on the lot. The bank finances 100% of the manufacturer’s invoice on behalf of the dealer.
There is no down payment, no consumer equity, and no borrower paying principle down every month. There is an unsold motor home that depreciates while it waits. And we have already shown that book is carrying real embedded losses. So when I look at a 31:1, I am not looking at a number in a vacuum. I am looking at 31 to1 on unsold depreciating inventory financed at 100% of invoice with no end customer no consumer equity concentrated dealers impaired collateral and a guarantor whose job is building RVs not insuring credit seen in that context 31 to1 is not just a large ratio it’s a warning there’s another problem with the stress test we are using a 20.5 55% rate measured on model year 2026 and older units.
Averages can still hide the dealer that actually creates the event. A large dealer sitting on older inventory, more prior year models, more lock queens or losses already moved into used coaches can be carrying a much uglier haircut than 20.55%. Manufacturers don’t need hundreds of dealers to fail at once. One large enough dealer can create a material liquidity event all by itself. Severity is what that event does to earnings after the inventory comes back.
Consider a $500 million repurchase event. At 20.55% the economic loss is $102.8 million. At 30% it is $150 million. The repurchase demand remains 500 million in both cases. What changes is the severity of the hit to the manufacturer’s earnings and shareholder equity. There is another problem with treating these stress cases as isolated events. One dealer failing because someone stole money is idiosyncratic.
The manufacturer can probably handle that. What we have instead is the same pressure on the whole dealer body at the same time. 16.72 months of supply, negative floor plan carry since 2022. depreciating collateral losses moving into used inventory. Every dealer is subject to the inventory overhang. Every dealer is subject to rising interest rates. Every dealer is subject to a stock market correction.
Every dealer is subject to the negative spread or flooring interest of 6% is subtracted from a gross profit of 1.44%. These risks do not hit one poorly dealer and spare the rest. They hit the entire dealer body at once and the repurchase agreements carry that hit to the manufacturer. The industry has never carried concentration and correlation risks at these levels and never at the same time. When the things you guaranteed start failing for the same reason, diversification disappears and everything is correlated.
That is when a contingent promise stops looking cheap. Inventory overhang, falling demand, rising rates, a stock market correction, concentration risk, correlation risk, a large dealer failure, or several smaller failures, and contingent repurchase agreements are eight identifiable risks. What are the odds that one or more of those risks play out in 2027? What are the odds that not a single one of them happens?
When the agreement is called, the manufacturer does not settle it with an accounting entry. Cash leaves its account. Inventory comes back. Then they have to sell it. The economic loss is the gap between what they paid under the repurchase agreement and what that inventory will bring in the market. The important point is simple. They can be required to put up substantially more cash than the coaches are worth today. Suppose a manufacturer had to provide $600,000 to satisfy a repurchase on a coach worth $480,000. They have used $600,000 of liquidity and taken back a depreciating asset worth $480,000. The $120,000 loss did not suddenly appear because the dealer failed.
The loss already existed. The failure just forced someone else to recognize it. Once again, accounting determines when the loss is recognized. Economics determine whether the loss exists. I have seen this film before. One of the benefits of owning an investment company like Global Financial Services is the variety of businesses, industries, and investments you get exposed to over the years. That experience has a way of training the eye.
When something looks familiar in a new setting, the antenna goes up. I’ve been involved in the ownership of banks and mortgage companies. I have invested in mortgages and I’ve created mortgage back securities and I have also purchased financial guarantees on those securities. Those businesses taught me how contingent guarantees work, how capital is supposed to stand behind them, and what happens when the capital is inadequate.
Years ago, when NIRVC first became a dealer and I was introduced to the manufacturers’s repurchase agreement, the similarities were immediate. I had seen this general structure before, and the more I have studied it, the more important the comparison has become. Think about what the repurchase agreement actually does. The bank advances 100% of the money required for the dealer to purchase the inventory from the manufacturer.
The dealer contributes zero equity. One of the principal credit protections supporting that loan is the manufacturer’s promise that if the dealer defaults while the inventory remains subject to the agreement, the manufacturer will stand behind the collateral according to the repurchase formula. That is credit enhancement. Economically, the manufacturer is performing an insurance function for the bank. But the manufacturer is not an insurance company.
It manufactures RVs. That distinction matters because companies whose business is guaranteeing credit are built around the possibility that claims will eventually occur. Their capital, their reserves, their liquidity, diversification, and regulatory structures are all designed around that risk. An RV manufacturer’s balance sheet is designed to manufacture RVs. Yet billions of dollars of floor plan lending depend in part upon its contingent promise to repurchase qualifying inventory when dealers fail. That is the comparison I want you to keep in mind.
Now, I want you to compare the structure with companies whose actual business was guaranteeing credit. But I want to be very careful with the comparison. I’m not putting these companies on one financial scale. Exposure divided by cash for an RV manufacturer is not the same accounting measure as risk to capital for a regulated financial guarantor. That is why I’ve separated them into two panels. These companies manufacture RVs.
Their balance sheets were not principally designed to ensure credit. These companies were specifically organized around underwriting and absorbing credit risk. For Ambach, MBIA, FGIC, and FSA, the historical leverage measure shown is net par outstanding divided by claims paying resources. MGIC’s current 9.9 times figure is its statutory net risk in force divided by policyholders position. They are not the same accounting measure.
The comparison I want you to see is structural, not mathematical. On the left are two manufacturing companies carrying billions of dollars of contingent promises to support dealer credit. On the right are companies whose entire business model was built around guaranteeing credit with capital reserves, underwriting, and regulatory structure specifically designed for that purpose. And history has taught us something important about those financial guaranurs.
Contingent obligations can look extraordinarily safe when claims are isolated. They look very different when losses become correlated. That is the lesson I am carrying over to the RV manufacturers. I’m not saying Thor is Amback. I am not saying Wnebago is MBIA. And I am certainly not claiming that a 31 times exposure to cash ratio predicts the same outcome as a 40 times net par outstanding to claims paying resources ratio.
I am asking a much simpler question. How much contingent risk exists? What financial resources stand behind it? And what happens if claims that historically arrived at one time begin arriving together? or if one substantially larger claim arrives from the failure of a major dealer. That is the question. And to understand why it matters, we still have to look at what is actually sitting underneath the guarantee. MGIC ensures a single family home mortgage after a retail customer has appeared.
A person selected a house. That person purchased the house. There was an actual retail transaction. The homeowner has equity in the property. There is a borrower making monthly payments. Principal is being advertised and the collateral is residential real estate. Now compare that with the dealer floor plan loan supported by a manufacturer repurchase agreement. There is no retail customer. Not baby.
There’s none. That is why the RV is sitting in the dealer’s inventory. The dealer borrowed 100% of the money required to buy it. Dealer contributed zero acquisition [snorts] equity. There is no consumer down payment. There is no consumer equity. There is no retail borrower advertising the principal. And the collateral is depreciating RV whose market value declines while it sits unsold. That is a fundamentally different risk may be the most important graphic in this chapter because now the comparison means something.
It is not simply the amount of contingent exposure. It’s what sits underneath it. A mortgage insurer is guaranteeing an enormous population of completed retail transactions involving actual homeowners, homeowner equity, monthly payments, advertising principal, and residential real estate. The RV manufacturer is standing behind debt used to finance unsold inventory. There is no retail customer. There is zero dealer acquisition equity.
The collateral depreciates. The collateral is already impaired. and the borrowers are concentrated. That is why no single ratio can tell us whether a manufacturer has sufficient capacity. We also have to understand the character of the risk. There’s another reason I believe that distinction matter. Thor says its repurchase reserve is based on recent historical experience supplemented by current economic and dealer conditions. Winnebago says its reserve is established based upon its repurchase agreements and historical loss experience.
Under ordinary circumstances that is entirely sensible. Lenders use history. Insurers use history. Manufacturers use history. I use history. But historical experiences is predictive only when tomorrow bears some reasonable resemblance to yesterday. Today does not. The motor home industry is sitting at 16.72 months of supply. That is the highest level in the entire historical series we’ve examined by a lot.
Inventory turns have fallen to approximately 72 turns per year. Dealer floor plan inventory economics have been negative since 2022. Floor plan rates remain higher and gross profit margins lower than during much of the historical period from which the manufacturers repurchase loss experience was accumulated. and the negative economics have persisted far longer. We estimate that current new motor home inventory contains more than $1 billion of embedded losses.
Our extrapolation across new motor homes, travel trailers, and fifth wheels produces about $4.91 billion of embedded losses. Dealers financed 100% of this inventory with borrowed money and contributed zero acquisition equity. And we already have established that carrying those losses indefinitely under today’s inventory economics creates severe financial pressure at the dealer level. There is no historical period in which the data we have examined that combines all those conditions at anything approaching today’s magnitude.
So my concern is not that Thor or Winnebago incorrectly calculated their reserves under their existing methodology. My concern is more fundamental. What if historical loss experience is no longer the right model for the risk being guaranteed today? Financial guarantors learned that lesson during the Great Recession. As mortgage and structured finance conditions deteriorated, loss estimates that had looked reasonable under historical experience changed dramatically because the environment itself had changed. History did not become useless because the accountant suddenly forgot how to calculate the world. the historical model was describing changed.
That is exactly what concerns me here. We are now sailing in historically uncharted waters. Thor and Wnebago may have calculated their reserves perfectly using their historical methodology. The question is whether yesterday’s loss experience tells us enough about the losses that could emerge from today’s unprecedented inventory overhang. History is a wonderful teacher, but it can become a terrible risk model when the environment changes structurally.
A reserve can be calculated perfectly from yesterday’s experience and still prove disastrously wrong if tomorrow looks nothing like yesterday. Their historical repurchase losses occurred in a world that did not have today’s inventory overhang, carrying cost, or dealer economics. I am not telling you what their reserve should be. I am telling you why I would not rely on historical loss experience alone to tell me what those reserves should be today.
Now connect that distinction back to the larger thesis of this video. The repurchase agreement does more than protect the lender against a dealer default. It changes how much credit the lender is willing to extend before retail demand exists. That matters because the manufacturer’s guarantee gives the bank additional protection. The bank is willing to finance 100% of the dealer’s inventory purchase.
That financing expands the dealer’s purchasing capacity. The dealer’s purchasing capacity becomes wholesale demand to the manufacturer and the manufacturer can recognize a wholesale sale before a retail customer has ever appeared. In other words, guarantee does not merely protect credit. It helps create it. And that credit helps create wholesale demand ahead of retail demand. That takes us directly back to the central thesis of this entire video. Every industry eventually gets the behavior its financial incentives reward.
Repurchase agreement is not simply an insurance policy sitting harmlessly in a drawer. It changes lending behavior. It expands dealer purchasing capacity and it increases the amount of inventory the dealer channel can absorb. Therefore, it increases the amount manufacturers can ship before consumers have actually purchased it. Now suppose the manufacturer performs. It finds the cash. It takes the inventory back and then it has another problem.
It has to sell it. But the dealer channel is already overstocked and financially strained. The manufacturer can offer the returned inventory to its dealer body. The dealer body already has too much inventory and insufficient liquidity. The manufacturer can discount the repurchased units enough to induce dealers to accept them, but those lower prices establish new market comparables. Those comparables reduce the value of identical or similar inventory already sitting throughout the channel, including inventory held by the purchasing dealer.
And now the mechanism begins feeding on itself. The manufacturer is now indirectly competing with the same dealer body it depends on to absorb its current production and keep its factories running. That is the structural problem. The guarantee consumes manufacturer liquidity at precisely the moment dealer liquidity is deteriorated and the mechanism available to dispose of the repurchased inventory can push prices lower across the remainder of the channel.
When an industry can’t sell what it produces, financing doesn’t solve the problem. It only postpones the reckoning. Floor plan financing can solve a timing problem. The repurchase agreement can provide additional contractual protection against that financing, but neither mechanism creates the retail customer who ultimately has to purchase the motor home. Financing can solve a timing problem. It cannot solve a demand problem.
Now, step back from four in Winnebago and look at the estimated 22.54 billion of new motor homes, travel trailers, and fifth wheels from chapter 8. This is by no means a prediction. It is strictly a stress test. It is not a substitute for Thor’s or Winnebago’s disclosed repurchase contingent liability. It is what cash and losses would look like if various slices of that $22.54 billion became subject to repurchase. 1% may sound small.
It’s not. 1% is $225 million of cash that has to move. 2% is $451 million of cash. 5% is more than $1.1 billion of cash. And 10% is more than 2.25 25 billion dollar of cash. Those are the liquidity required. At the 20.55% embedded loss measured on model year 2026 and older inventory, the associated losses would be 46.3 million, $92.6 million, $231.6 million, and $463 million.
And those losses could be materially larger because the inventory that comes back in a repurchase is most likely coming back from a financially weak dealer whose finances were weakened by excessively aged inventory that can carry more loss than the average 20.55% loss on the 2026 and older model years. I also reviewed the manufacturers’s debt agreements because I wanted to know whether Thor and Winnebago could simply borrow their way through a major repurchase event.
Both companies have additional assetbased borrowing capacity, but we have already established the important distinction. Borrowing capacity is not capital. A manufacturer can use a revolving credit facility to supply liquidity, but that simply replaces cash with additional debt. A repurchase event therefore attacks the manufacturer from two direction. On one side, the manufacturer must consume cash or borrow more money to satisfy the lender.
On the other side, the loss embedded in the returned inventory reduces earnings and shareholders equity. And because these facilities are assetbased, their availability depends upon eligible collateral and borrowing based calculation. A large enough event can also bring additional lender protections and financial covenants into play. I cannot responsibly tell you that an embedded loss of exactly X dollars automatically violates either Thor’s or Winnebago’s debt covenants.
The agreements do not work that simply. What I can tell you is a major repurchase event attacks the exact variables lenders monitor. cash, debt, borrowing availability, collateral values, earnings, shareholder equity, and covenant headroom. Borrowing money to satisfy a guarantee does not make the risk disappear. It adds another creditor. We have now followed the repayment waterfall from the collateral to the dealer and finally to the manufacturer.
What we discovered is remarkable. The manufacturer is economically performing an insurance function for the floor plan lender but without being a business whose primary purpose is underwriting and absorbing credit risk. Thor has more financial capacity. Winnebago has less. But the larger question is not which manufacturer is stronger or which one might experience trouble first. The larger question is why the banking system has treated manufacturer repurchase agreements as though they transform 100% finance dealer inventory into protected credit without asking whether the balance sheets behind those guarantees were ever designed to withstand the very event for which the guarantees exist.
That is the question I believe lenders need to start asking. A repurchase agreement provides contractual protection. It does not eliminate risk. It determines where the risk goes next. There’s another point that matters because this industry has experienced periods of negative dealer carry before. We saw in chapter six falling interest rates helped restore positive dealer inventory economics after 2007 and again after 2018.
That is not what is happening today. The estimated floor plan rate has already declined from the 2023 peak. But motor home inventory supply has continued growing from 11.14 months in 2023 to 16.72 months today. Lower borrowing costs have not repaired the economics because inventory velocity has deteriorated faster than financing costs have declined. That is what makes the current environment different from those earlier episodes. Interest rates can temporarily mask an inventory problem. They cannot permanently cure an incentive structure that continually creates more inventory than retail demand can absorb.
The industry does not need another temporary rescue from lower interest rates. It needs a capital structure that prevents the inventory imbalance from being created in the first place. After following the repayment waterfall all the way through, I think we can finally see the problem for what it is. The repurchase agreement does not eliminate the financial consequences of excess production. It changes who bears them and when they are recognized.
As long as the dealer remains solvent, the losses can remain in dealer inventory. If the dealer fails, those losses can move upstream to the manufacturer. And if the manufacturer cannot absorb a sufficiently large or correlated risk event without materially impairing its own financial condition, some portion of the risk can ultimately find its way back to the lender. The repurchase agreement was intended to have protected.
That is why the unprecedented inventory overhang matters so much. The structure works remarkably well when defaults are isolated. Collateral values remain reasonably stable and historical loss experience remains predictive. But that is not the environment we are analyzing today. Today the collateral is impaired. Dealer inventory economics have remained negative for years. The dealer body is carrying substantial embedded losses under negative inventory economics and the conditions producing those losses are correlated across the industry.
The repurchase agreement can change the timing of the recognition. It can change which ballot sheet recognizes the loss. It can even postpone the day when somebody has to recognize it. We have now tested the collateral. We have tested the borrower and we have tested the manufacturer backs stop. The next question is no longer whether the current capital structure can keep functioning under normal conditions. Obviously, it can.
It has for decades. The question is what happens when conditions are no longer normal. And if the economics no longer work for the dealer and the financial backs stop was never designed for the large correlated failure, eventually the market itself forces the correction. Which brings us to the next question. What happens if nothing changes? At the end of the last chapter, we arrived at a question the industry eventually has to answer.
What happens if nothing changes? What happens if
Chapter 11: What Happens If Nothing Changes?
manufacturers continue producing more inventory than retail demand can absorb? What happens if banks continue financing 100% of the manufacturers’s invoice on behalf of the dealer? What happens if dealers continue contributing zero equity to their new motor home inventory? What happens if manufacturer repurchase agreements continue giving lenders the contractual protection that allows more credit to flow into the system?
And what happens if everyone continues hoping that lower interest rates, stronger consumer confidence, or another surge in RV demand will eventually make the imbalance disappear? The answer, in my opinion, is not mysterious. The market eventually forces the industry to do what the industry was unwilling to do voluntarily. There’s a famous line often attributed to John Maynard Kanes. Markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent.
Whether Kane’s actually said it is less important to me than the truth contained in the idea. A market can behave irrationally for a surprisingly long time. Credit can extend the period and clearly it has. Accounting can extend the period. Optimism can extend the period. Ignorance can extend the period. Manufacturer assistance can extend the period. Lender forbearance can extend the period. A temporary decline in interest rates can extend the period.
But none of those things will repeal the economics. Eventually, somebody has to earn an adequate return on the capital employed. And when an industry consistently fails to produce that return, capital begins looking for somewhere else to go. One of the great things about capital is that it is emotionally indifferent. Capital does not care how long a company has been in business. It does not care how famous the brand is. It does not care how much the founder sacrificed.
It does not care how beautiful the product is. It asks a much simpler question. What am I earning for the risk I am taking? If the answer is not enough, capital eventually leaves. That is why I keep coming back to capital allocation throughout this video. The RV industry talks constantly about unit volume, market share, dealer count, retail registrations, shipments, production schedules, plant utilization, and market position.
Those things do matter, but none of them can outrun the cost of capital forever. A dealer with millions of dollars committed to facilities, people, systems, working capital has to earn an adequate return. A manufacturer with factories, employees, engineers, warranties, tooling, working capital, and billions of dollars of contingent repurchase exposure has to earn an adequate return. A bank lending against depreciating inventory has to earn an adequate risk adjusted return.
When those returns become inadequate for long enough, ownership changes, companies get sold, assets get sold, debt gets restructured, businesses close, or owners simply decide there are better places for their capital. Capital always goes where it’s best treated. Let’s start with the dealers. The dealer body has already been consolidating for years, and there are legitimate economic advantages to scale. A larger dealer can spread advertising, technology, accounting, management, and other fixed costs across more revenue.
It can move inventory between markets, centralize functions, negotiate more effectively with manufacturers and lenders, and survive losses that might overwhelm a smaller dealer. But scale is not magic. Every time a dealer buys another dealer for cash, another manufacturer for cash, that cash walks out of the industry with the seller. What often comes back onto the buyer’s balance sheet after the trucks and the dirt is goodwill, intangibles, air.
The lot is not stronger because the name on the door changed. The industry swapped cash for an accounting asset. Consolidation did not put new operating capital into the channel. It took cash out and left a bigger name on the door. A larger version of a bad economic model is still a bad economic model. A dealer with $100 million of inventory turning too slowly still has a problem. A dealer with $1 billion of inventory turning too slowly has a much bigger problem.
So I do not believe the future is simply that the biggest dealers win. The future belongs to dealers that combine scale with capital discipline. They understand inventory returns. They understand return on invested capital. They understand that gross profit margin without turns is an illusion. They understand that every unit sitting on the lot is consuming capital every day. And they understand that taking another unit merely because the manufacturer offers attractive terms does not make that unit economically attractive.
The weaker dealers will eventually run out of alternatives. Some will sell, some will close locations, some will surrender franchises, some will be acquired, some will disappear, and some will continue to operate until a lender reduces or eliminates their flooring line. Curtailments overtake them and inventory mark to market exposes the whole or one bad quarter too many finally removes their choices. That is usually how consolidation happens.
The economics gradually eliminate the alternatives. The same pressures apply upstream. The RV industry has more brands, more floor plans, more factories, more dealers, and more manufacturing capacity in today’s retail demand economically support. Every brand carries cost, every floor plan carries cost, every engineering variation carries cost, every production line carries cost, every warranty system carries cost, and every factory has to be fed.
That last point is especially important. Once a manufacturer has built the plant, hired the employees, bought the equipment, and created the overhead structure, slowing production becomes painful. Every unit not produced means fixed manufacturing costs are spread across fewer units. Margins fall, plant utilization deteriorates, employees become underutilized, suppliers lose volume, management gets questioned. So the factory itself has now become a part of the incentive structure.
The economic answer may be to build fewer units. The short-term accounting answer can make building fewer units painful. Eventually, those two realities collide. If retail demand cannot support the current amount of manufacturing capacity, manufacturing capacity ultimately has to decline. No one, no matter how big, can defy the gravity of the market. That can happen through plant closures, brand eliminations, factory consolidation, acquisitions, mergers, or the disappearance of financially weaker manufacturers.
I do not know which companies will combine, which brands will disappear, or which factories will close, but I do believe the economic direction is unavoidable. This brings us back to where this video began. Patrick and LCI announced their merger on June 30th, 2026. I don’t believe that deal caused the structural issues we’ve been discussing. I believe it tells us where a maturing industry is going. The component side has produced the strongest economics in the chain. When two large suppliers combine, their leverage against the companies that buy from them goes up.
Now look at the manufacturing in the middle. Upstream suppliers are getting larger. Downstream dealers are getting larger. The supplier wants more margin. The dealer needs more margin. The manufacturer sits between them with excess capacity and overflowing dealer channel. That is why the transaction matters beyond the component industry. It is a signal of maturation. Mature industries consolidate because growth becomes harder.
Excess capacity becomes expensive. Duplicative overheads becomes difficult to justify and capital starts demanding efficiency. The RV industry is not exempt from the laws of capital. I am not reporting that any particular transactions being discussed or ever been discussed. I have no knowledge of any such transaction. But as an investor, I cannot look at supplier consolidation, dealer consolidation, excess manufacturing capacity, and weak returns without asking what a rational market response will eventually be. Could two major RV manufacturers combine someday?
Of course they could. For illustration only, imagine companies with the scale of Thor and Winnebago combining. Again, I’m not predicting that transaction. I am illustrating the economics. A combination could theoretically eliminate applicative corporate overhead, consolidate purchasing, rationalize brands, consolidate factories, eliminate redundant products, improve plant utilization, level the playing field with the suppliers, and reduce the amount of capital required to serve the same level of retail demand.
Would there be antirust questions? Absolutely, particularly in certain motor home categories. Would integration be difficult? Certainly. Would every brand survive? Probably not and should not. That is why the specific transaction is not the point. The point is what the economics encourage. When an industry has too much capacity and inadequate returns, consolidation becomes one of the ways market removes the excess. There is an important warning.
A merger can remove factories. It can remove brands. It can eliminate duplicative overhead. It can reduce capacity. What it cannot fix is an incentive structure that continues rewarding wholesale shipments ahead of retail demand. Two manufacturers operating under the same wrong incentives can merge and become one larger manufacturer operating under the same wrong incentives. Consolidation can treat the symptom, but it will not cure the disease.
I also believe the number of brands and floor plans has to decline. This is not merely a product decision. It’s a capital allocation decision throughout the channel. Every additional floor plan fragments demand. Every additional configuration requires inventory. Add colors, chassis combinations, options, regional preferences, and model year transitions, and the odds that the exact unit sitting at the exact dealer matches the next customer become smaller and smaller.
The dealer responds by stocking more inventory. More inventory requires more floor plan credit. More credit produces more carrying costs. More carrying cost creates more pressure to discount aging units. Something that appears to the customer as product choice quickly becomes enormous capital intensity for the dealer and the excessive depreciation for the customer. At some point, someone needs to ask whether another floor plan creates enough incremental retail demand to justify the inventory required to support it.
If the answer is no, the capital should not be deployed. Fewer brands and fewer floor plans can mean higher volume per product, faster inventory turns, better parts, better parts commonality, simpler service, better quality, and less aged inventory. That is certainly not evidence of a weaker industry. It is evidence of a more rational one. We’ll discuss brands and floor plans in more detail later in this video.
Banks are not passive observers in this system. They helped create the financing structure. As long as lenders finance 100% of the manufacturer’s invoice on behalf of the dealer and rely on the manufacturers’s repurchase agreements for additional protections, enormous amounts of inventory can and are being financed ahead of retail demand. I do not have to go hunting for a stranger’s term sheet to show lenders misguided reliance on the manufacturer’s repurchase agreements.
NIRVC’s own loans make the point. Our storage buildings required 20% equity when we built them. They are full. Coach owners pay rent. Yet, we pay a higher floating interest rate on our real estate than we pay on our floating rate flooring line. Camping World’s year end 2025 filing shows the same thing. Their floor plan rate was 5.89%. Their main real estate facility was 6.14%. That is a quarter percentage point higher.
Think about that for a minute. The motor home is financed at 100% of the manufacturers’s invoice. No dealer equity, no retail buyer, no rent roll. The building has tenants, leases, and 20% cash in the deal at inception, and the motor home sitting on the dealer’s lot has the cheaper loan. That illustrates what the repurchase agreement is worth to the bank. But I promise you that banks respond to losses.
Credit standards rarely tighten because everybody suddenly becomes philosophical. Tighten when yesterday’s assumptions become impossible to defend. Then the questions change, advance rates change, borrowing bases change, concentration limits change, dealer equity requirements change, manufacturer exposure limits change, inventory aging rules change, and something considered safe for years can suddenly become unacceptable.
I have watched that process play out five times in my life in different industries, and I believe I may be about to watch it play out for a sixth time. A risk can remain largely invisible because historical losses were low. Then there is one large loss, one large dealer going down and everybody suddenly wants to know what their exposure is. Another loss occurs. Reporting increases. Regulators begin asking questions.
Credit policies change. And when lenders change behavior under stress, they rarely change it gently. They tend to overreact. Credit that once appeared abundant becomes scarce. That is when a liquidity problem can become a solveny problem very quickly. My concern is that the RV industry shouldn’t need a major dealer failure or a manufacturer repurchase event to teach lenders something the numbers are already telling us.
The current system handles isolated problems reasonably well. One dealer fails, one manufacturer handles the repurchase, one lender is protected, one product category slows, inventory gets moved. Those are manageable events. The dangerous moment comes when a sufficiently large dealer fails, triggering a domino effect, and suddenly many participants need liquidity for the same reason. At the same time, dealers need cash because inventory is aging and curtailments have kicked in. Manufacturers need cash because dealers are failing.
Bankers become more conservative because the RVs serving as collateral are falling in value faster than the demand can sell them. Suppliers tighten terms because production is slowing. Customers demand larger discounts because inventory is everywhere. Used values fall because new units are being discounted and liquidated. the excess depreciation and therefore the cost of ownership for customers goes up and everyone begins protecting cash simultaneously. That is when leverage changes character. The same debt that looked deficient during expansion becomes restrictive during a contraction.
The repurchase agreement that helped create credit becomes a claim on manufacturers liquidity. The inventory supporting the borrowing base becomes less valuable and the lender that once wanted more floor plan business suddenly wants less exposure. That is why the current inventory overhang matters so much. The danger is not simply that the industry has too much inventory. The danger is that the inventory is financed inside an interconnected system.
A principle I’ve always learned in this industry is a manufacturer is only as good as its weakest dealer. And a dealer is only as good as a manufacturer lets them be. Strong manufacturer can suffer and weak dealers carry too much of its inventory. Strong dealer can suffer when a manufacturer overproduces and destroys pricing throughout the channel. Everybody needs everybody. The bank needs the manufacturers’s guarantee.
The manufacturer needs the banks to finance dealers. The dealers need the bank in order to purchase inventory. The manufacturer needs the dealer for distribution. The supplier needs the manufacturer for volume. But eventually there is one participant who has to fund the entire chain permanently, the retail customer. A manufacturer shipment is not final demand. A dealer order is not final demand. A floor plan advance is not final demand.
A repurchase agreement is not final demand. The retail customer is final demand. Everything else is financing time between production and that customer. And when the industry builds too much inventory for too long, eventually that time becomes more expensive than the capital structure can support. I want to make one thing very clear. None of this means I believe the RV industry is dying. I believe deeply in the product and the lifestyle. Millions of people will continue wanting the freedom, flexibility, travel, family experiences, memories, and the independence RV ownership provides.
The problem is not the RV. The problem is the capital structure surrounding how too many RVs get produced, financed, distributed, and sold. A great product can exist inside a bad incentive structure. A healthy customer market can be served by too much manufacturing capacity. And an industry can become healthier by removing excess capacity. Because what I’m describing is not the end of the RV industry. It is the rationalization of an industry whose financial structure allowed supply to separate from demand for too long. Waiting does not fix the incentives.
The temptation, of course, is to wait. Wait for interest rates to fall. Wait for consumer confidence to improve. Wait for another strong selling season. Wait for used values to stabilize. Wait for the inventory to work itself out. Sometimes waiting makes sense. If an inventory imbalance is temporary and the underlying capital structure is sound, time can cure it. But if the capital structure continually recreates the imbalance, waiting simply allows the problem to compound.
Interest continues acrewing. Units continue aging. Model year changes, discounting increases, dealer liquidity deteriorates, manufacturers spend more money supporting aged inventory, and the marktomarket losses grow. Financing can buy time, but time is not free. Floor plan lending is a race against the clock. Eventually, the clock wins that race. What happens if nothing else changes? The market eventually makes the changes.
Dealer consolidation accelerates. Factories close. Inventory gets liquidated, banks tighten, production is forced lower. That is not a strategy. That is the market doing what the industry would not do. And capital leaves businesses that cannot earn an adequate return for the risk being taken. The process can happen slowly or it can happen very quickly. And that brings us to the next question. If the current financial incentives helped create the problem, what would actually change those incentives? For most of this video, I have focused heavily on the manufacturers’s repurchase agreement because I believe it sits at the center of the financing
Chapter 12: What Would Actually Change Incentives?
structure that allows wholesale shipments to become detached from retail demand. At first glance, the obvious solution might seem to be simple. Get rid of the repurchase agreement. But there is a serious problem with that answer. Why on earth would a manufacturer voluntarily stop signing it? The repurchase agreement helps the manufacturer’s dealers obtain more credit. More credit gives those dealers greater capacity to accept inventory. And greater dealer capacity allows the manufacturer to build, sell, and ship more motor homes to dealers.
Why would manufacturers voluntarily give that up? They wouldn’t. And why on earth would a bank voluntarily give up the manufacturers’s repurchase agreement? The agreement gives the bank another balance sheet standing behind its loan. Why would banks voluntarily surrender additional credit protection? They wouldn’t either. And after spending this entire video explaining that every industry eventually gets the behavior its financial incentives reward, I would be contradicting myself if my solution rested on manufacturers and banks voluntarily acting against their own economic interests.
That they will not do. I don’t believe the answer is simply eliminating the manufacturer repurchase agreement. I believe the answer is changing the financing structure around it. The manufacturers can keep signing the agreement. The banks can keep requiring it, but the repurchase agreement should stop functioning as a substitute for dealer equity and standalone dealer underwriting. That is a very different solution. Banks already require equity on used motor homes.
They should do the same on new. the repurchase agreement can stay. And it brings me to one of the primary reasons I made this video. This video is for the banks and regulators because if the analysis in this video is remotely correct, I don’t believe the RV industry can solve this problem by simply asking manufacturers and dealers to behave differently. Somebody upstream from those incentives has to act first. That is the source of capital and the regulators responsible for the safety and soundness of that capital.
If this industry is going to change deliberately rather than waiting for a major loss to change it involuntarily, the providers of capital have to begin the conversation. One reason I’ve become increasingly concerned about the RV industry is that the underlying financial pattern is not new. airlines after deregulation in the late 70s and again after 911 and 2008. Automobiles in the late 70s and again in 2008 and 2009. We have watched versions of it in banking and the savings and loan crisis in the late 80s and early 90s. Commercial real estate in the late 80s and again in 2008.
Technology and telecommunications during the dotcom boom and bust in the late 90s and early 2000s. housing, mortgages, and CDOS’s in 2007 and 2008. Energy in the Shell boom, then the 2014 price collapse, and perhaps the closest analogy of all, manufactured housing in the late 90s and early 2000s. Different assets, different companies, different decades, different financing structures, but the progression is remarkably familiar. Capital becomes plentiful.
Credit becomes easy. Capacity expands. Growth gets rewarded ahead of return. Asset values appear to justify more lending. Debt fills the gap where equity should be. Participants become increasingly comfortable because the structure has worked for years. Then returns deteriorate. Collateral values decline. Equity begins disappearing. Credit tightens. Weak participants fail. Capacity comes out. consolidation accelerates and eventually the surviving companies are forced to earn adequate returns on capital again.
Debt is almost always the single through line behind every financial crisis. It is a very powerful optimistic force. If we envision the future as an everexpanding field of opportunity the way manufacturers and dealers did coming out of co why shouldn’t we marshall some of that future demand for use today? That is precisely what debt does. It pulls the promise of tomorrow forward to today. But when greed and demand get out of balance, excesses are created and the seeds of the next correction are planted.
At some point, there isn’t enough optimism to draw from. Darkness sets in and then the correction happens slowly, then suddenly. Capital mispriced for long enough will almost always produce remarkably familiar results. And there is one of those industries I want to spend a little more time on because I do not think it’s merely an analogy. I think it may be the prequil. Manufactured housing gets my attention because the financial plumbing was eerily similar to what we see in the RV industry today. factorybuilt high ticket products, manufacturers, independent dealers, dealer inventory, floor plan lenders, depreciating collateral, manufacturer repurchase agreements, retail financing, and an industry whose growth became increasingly dependent on the continued availability of capital.
I also have a personal reason for understanding that industry. Long before I ever became an RV dealer through a subsidiary of a company I owned, we acquired a mortgage company. From 1984 through 1987, we were the largest originator and serer of FHA loans collateralized by manufacturer homes in the country. Back then, we still called them mobile homes. I saw that industry from the lender side.
I knew the manufacturers. I saw the dealers. We provided consumer financing. The manufactured homes were our collateral and I saw just how dependent the entire ecosystem was on the continued availability of capital. We sold that mortgage company in 1987. So when I compare manufactured housing with the RV industry today, I’m not comparing two industries I only know from spreadsheets. I have lived inside both of them. And that is one reason what happened next in manufactured housing should get our attention.
During the 1990s, credit became increasingly abundant, manufacturing capacity increased, dealer capacity increased, retail lending expanded, and wholesale shipments increased dramatically from 171,000 homes in 1991 to 373,000 in 1998. To give you a sense of comparative scale, wholesale RV shipments in 2025 were 342,220 units. That was all RVs, tollables, and motor homes. Motor homes by themselves were about 36,000.
The manufactured housing peak in 1998 and total 2025 RV production sit in the same ballpark. At its peak in 1998, the manufactured housing industry shipped 373,000 homes. That same year, placements, the retail sales analog, were 374,000 homes. The problem was not that single year. Shipments had been running ahead of placements for years. HUD noted that from 1992 on shipments ran ahead of placements every year and by 1997 placements were only 80% of shipments. Dealer inventory at year end 1997 was more than 50% of annual placements. Homes for sale on dealers lots ran in the 80s to 90,000 range at the peak.
By 1998, dealer lots were already heavy. Then the credit that made the boom possible left and shipments fell from 373,000 to 251,000 in two years and continued to fall to under 50,000 manufactured homes by 2009. I find three statements from HUD absolutely chilling when I put them next to the motor home channel. First, by 1997 placements were only about 80% of shipments. Our trailing 12 months ended June 30th, 2026 were 31,629 retail sold motor homes against 39,159 motor homes shipped.
That is 81% almost the same percentage. However, year to date through June 30th, 2026, it is already worse. 14,892 retail sales versus 20,495 new motor homes shipped. That is 73% below HUD’s full year 1997 figure of 80%. Second, dealer inventory at year end 1997 was more than 50% of annual placements. HUD was looking at homes on dealers lots against a year’s worth of placements or sales.
We are looking at the cumulative surplus of shipments over retail new sales registrations versus one year of sales. HUD was a census of what was on dealers lots. Ours is shipments minus retail sales with the difference sitting on dealers lots or in the channel. But still the same question. Manufactured housing’s ratio was just over 50% the year before credit left the industry. The motor home industry has 44,078 new motor home inventory overhang against retail sales of 31,629 motor homes.
That is 139% of one year’s retail sales. Third, homes for sale on dealers lots ran in the 80 to 90,000 range at the peak, even against 374,000 of placements or 1998 sales. Manufactured housing dealers were still turning their inventory between 4.2 and 4.7 times a year. Today, motor home dealers are sitting on 16.72 months of supply. That is.72 turns a year. As long as financing remained plentiful in manufactured housing, the system kept moving.
But the underlying economics had been deteriorating for years. Retail underwriting weakened. Repossession rates increased. used and repossessed manufactured homes began returning to the market. Those repossessions competed directly against new manufactured homes. Collateral values failed. Dealer inventories increased. Dealers began failing. And then something extremely important happened. The manufacturer repurchase agreements were no longer theoretical contingent obligations sitting quietly in a footnote.
They began getting exercised. Champion Enterprises experienced exactly that when Parker Holmes, Champion’s largest independent dealer, failed. Parker represented three and a half% of Champion’s wholesale home shipments in 1998. 3 12% does not sound enormous, but when Parker failed, Champion had to repurchase 1,850 homes for approximately $70 million. Champion recorded an inventory write down of 26.5 million and $7.1 million of uncollectible receivables.
That was a $33.6 million pre-tax charge. Parker was one dealer. Champion had many dealers. When that one dealer failed, the contingent obligation became real. The manufacturer had to produce cash. The inventory came back. The market value of that inventory was lower than its carrying value. and Champion had to recognize the loss. The repurchase agreement did exactly what it was designed to do. The bank was protected. The risk moved upstream until you look at the concentration in motor homes today.
Parker was just three and a half% of a single manufacturer champion. Each of those four dealer groups is already more than three times that 3 and a half%. Their percentages are of the entire motor home industry’s annual sales, not of just one manufacturer. Collectively, they are half of US motor home sales. That is the concentration the repurchase agreement now sits behind. Make no mistake, we don’t need to leave the RV industry to see what happens when the repurchase agreement stops being a footnote.
In 2009, Monaco Coach filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and the record is not subtle. Dealers financed 100% of their new inventory on floor plan lines. Manufacturers signed repurchase agreements with those floor plan lenders. When the dealers defaulted, the lenders called the agreements. In February of 2009, Monaco entered into forbearance with Bank of America and GE Commercial Distribution Finance because the repurchase demands had risen substantially above historical levels.
By mid 2008, its contingent repurchase exposure was $488 million. They tried to buy time. Then they filed for bankruptcy. Country Coach filed. Fleetwood Enterprises filed. National RV had already gone dark in November of 2007. The repurchase agreements didn’t create the recession. Credit tightened and retail demand for motor homes collapsed. All the repurchase agreements did was decide who got the inventory back when the dealer couldn’t pay the bank.
Parker was one dealer at 3 and a half% of one manufacturer. 2009 was many motor home dealers at once. Through consolidation, today’s dealers are much larger and more concentrated. That is what happened to this industry the last time the repurchase agreement stopped being just another disclosure sitting quietly in a footnote. I do not think Parker is important because three and a half% is some magical threshold. It is important because Parker was Champion’s largest dealer and became the first domino large enough to expose the correlated risk embedded in the structure. 2009 showed what happened when more than one domino falls.
The danger in a system like this is not hundreds of small independent failures. The danger is a large enough dealer failure that creates a material manufacturer liquidity event, damages confidence, reveals collateral losses, and causes lenders to re-evaluate the assumptions underlying their entire portfolio. Once that happens, behavior changes very quickly. lenders began asking different questions. How much exposure do we have to this manufacturer?
How much exposure do we have to this dealer? What is the collateral actually worth? How much equity does the dealer really have? How much capacity does the manufacturer actually have under the repurchase agreement? What happens if there is another Parker? What happens if several fail together? Those are all the same questions I believe RV lenders should be asking today. The correction in manufactured housing was not subtle. Shipments collapsed, manufacturers collapsed, dealers failed, retail lenders exited, floor plan credit contracted, factories closed, brands disappeared, capacity came out, and the entire industry became dramatically smaller.
The companies that survived became more disciplined. Retail underwriting improved. Production aligned more closely with actual customer demand. The number of manufacturers declined. The number of dealers declined. The financing structure changed. Capital was forced to behave differently because the old economics stopped working. Manufactured housing did eventually recover. But the market imposed the discipline. The participants did not voluntarily choose it before the losses arrived.
The market will always be the law. Anything else is just a recommendation. If eliminating the repurchase agreement is neither necessary nor realistic, what would actually change the incentives? I believe the answer begins with where all lending begins, and that would be dealer equity. Today, the bank finances 100% of the manufacturer’s invoice on behalf of the dealer. The dealer contributes zero acquisition equity.
The manufacturer receives the cash. The bank takes the collateral. The manufacturer provides the repurchase agreement. The dealer receives the inventory. The financial system therefore allows the dealer to make an inventory decision without placing meaningful permanent capital underneath that decision. That is precisely what needs to change. The simplest way to restore the governor on capital is to require the dealer to contribute meaningful equity towards new inventory purchases.
Not because dealers are bad, not because banks are foolish, not because manufacturers are reckless, but because capital disciplines decisions. If the dealer has to put real money into every new motor home, every purchase decision changes. Do we really need this unit? How quickly will it turn? What is the expected margin? What is the likely depreciation? How many identical units do we already have? How much cash will this tie up and for how long?
What return are we earning on our equity? Could that capital earn more somewhere else? Those questions become much sharper and more focused when the dealer’s own money is leaving his bank account. And because dealer equity is finite, his purchasing capacity becomes finite, too. The dealer cannot simply expand inventory because another dollar of floor plan capacity exists. The dealer’s capital becomes the governor. That is exactly what has been missing. The second change would directly follow from the first.
The bank should underwrite the dealer on the dealer’s standalone ability to repay without any regard to manufacturers repurchase agreements. The repurchase agreement should provide some additional protection. It should not be a substitute for the borrower’s own financial capacity. The third change is valuing the collateral. The bank should know what the inventory is actually worth at all times, not simply what the manufacturer invoiced the motor home for, not simply what the dealer carries its used motor homes on its books for. What would the inventory sell for in the market today?
Wholesale book values and the actual selling price are not the same thing. We have kept a database of every pre-owned motor home we have ever sold and what book value was on the date it was sold. Actual realized selling prices range from 60% of wholesale book value to 138% of wholesale book value. That is an enormous range. If a lender is valuing a dealer’s inventory against wholesale book, while the motor homes that are that lender’s collateral are being sold for far less than book value, that lender only knows the book value. That does not mean the lender knows its collateral.
That is why I believe floor plan lending should be underwritten to market, not merely to wholesale book values. The fourth change is borrowing capacity. The dealer’s floor plan availability should be tethered to its performance, inventory turns, aging, liquidity, tangible net worth, collateral impairment, historical losses, and the dealer’s actual ability to support the inventory with permanent capital. A dealer turning inventory rapidly and maintaining strong liquidity should earn greater borrowing flexibility.
A dealer accumulating aged inventory should not continue receiving additional capacity simply because the manufacturer remains willing to sign the repurchase agreement. That is how capital begins enforcing discipline. The bank doesn’t need to tell the dealer what to order. The bank simply prices and allocates credit based on the economic performance of the collateral and the dealer. The dealer makes its inventory decisions, but the decisions will finally have a capital consequence. The fifth change is perhaps the simplest.
If the manufacturer wants to produce more inventory and dealers are willing to support with their own equity, that excess inventory should remain with the manufacturer. The manufacturer owns the factory. The manufacturer controls production. The manufacturer chooses the run rate. The manufacturer should therefore bear the financial consequences of producing beyond what its dealer network is willing to purchase with actual capital. Not unlike the relationship the manufacturer has with its suppliers. That changes the production decision dramatically.
The question stops being, can I find another dealer with enough floor plan availability to take this unit? Two, do I want to invest my own balance sheet in producing this unit before retail demand exists? That is exactly the question we need manufacturers asking. How much cash will this consume? How large is the inventory overhang? How long will these units sit? What will the carrying cost be? What happens if market values fall?
What return am I earning on this capital? Do I really want to build the thousandth and first unit? Those questions become much more important when the party controlling the production owns the economic consequences. The risk belongs on the balance sheet of the party controlling the decision that creates the risk. Today, too much production risk is financed on dealers balance sheets. That is backwards. Production starts following retail.
Now imagine how the system behaves if these incentives change and then retail demand slows. The dealer will sell fewer motor homes. The dealer’s capital is tied up longer as inventory returns fall and collateral values decline. The lender sees it. The dealer’s equity becomes constrained and as a result, the dealer orders fewer motor homes. The manufacturer sees a decline in orders and their production slows. That is not a crisis.
It’s the system working. Conversely, when retail demand improves, dealer inventory sells faster. Cash returns to the dealer quicker. Equity becomes available. Turns improve. The bank sees stronger performance. The dealer increases its orders to keep pace with retail demand. Manufacturers increase their production. Production will follow retail demand because the capital structure finally enforces discipline on the retail signal being transmitted backward through the channel.
That is the feedback loop the industry is missing today. In fact, it has been missing for decades. I am not arguing against floor plan financing. To the contrary, floor plan credit is important. Dealers need inventory. Customers need products to see and to test. Manufacturers need distribution. Floor plan credit is what allows the system to operate efficiently. The problem is not the credit. The problem is credit is substituting for equity. Credit should amplify capital.
It should not replace capital. A dealer should borrow, but the dealer should also have his own money at risk. The bank should finance inventory, but the bank should know what its collateral is actually worth. A manufacturer can provide additional credit support, but that support should not become permission to finance 100% of the manufacturer’s invoice on behalf of a dealer. Not when the dealer is contributing zero purchase equity.
The people who supply the capital do not make that distinction. History has already shown us what comes next. Manufactured housing lived it from 1998 to 2009. The RV industry lived a version of it in the Great Recession of 2008 and 2009. Once lenders experience the risk through actual losses. They do not make gentle adjustments. They move to protect capital. They reduce exposure by reducing credit lines. They lower advance rates.
They tighten standards. And some leave. Credit that was once abundant becomes scarce and the entire industry will suddenly be trying to obtain liquidity at the same time. That is the involuntary correction. Whether the RV industry still has a chance to avoid it depends on whether the people who supply the capital make the distinction before the losses make it for them. There is one more thing I would like to address because I suspect a dealer or an analyst may be asking this question.
If I am correct in my analysis, do I expect lenders to suddenly wake up and start marking every dealer to market, demand enormous amounts of new equity, rigidly enforce every curtailment, and create the very dealer failures I’ve bent this video warning about? No, that is certainly not how I would manage this if I still owned a bank. And it is not what I would expect any other bank to do either.
I believe this industry should already be in a workout mode. In fact, I suspect it should have been there a couple of years ago. The lenders are economically forstalling a workout today. They just do not know they are. Yet, the first step in solving any problem is admitting the problem exists. A workout doesn’t mean immediately liquidating the borrower. Quite the opposite. The objective of a good workout is to maximize recovery while preserving the borrower’s ability to continue operating to work through the problem.
The first thing I would do if the loans were mine is determine exactly how large the problem is. I would put a process in place to mark every dealer’s new and used inventory to market on a regular schedule, probably every 60 days when the new wholesale book values are published. Knowing the loss exists does not mean I have to force the dealer to recognize all of it in cash tomorrow morning. It means I finally know what my collateral is worth.
There’s an enormous difference between understanding a problem and detonating it. Marking collateral to market is risk management. Deciding how quickly the borrower has to cure the deficiency is a workout strategy. And frankly, it is not my place to tell the largest and most sophisticated banks in this country how to conduct a workout. They already know how to do that. But I can tell you how I would think about the problem if the loans were mine.
The dealer body already has an enormous embedded loss to absorb. If I’m the bank, I’m not demanding that equity today. Today, I need the dealer’s available cash to absorb embedded inventory losses, maintain operations, and work through the inventory overhang. I need the dealer to stay alive. I need the dealer operating, and I need the dealer selling. At the same time, I cannot continue financing the growth of the problem.
So, I would separate the inventory already on the ground from the new inventory entering the system. Clearing yesterday’s inventory earns the ability to finance tomorrow’s inventory. A dealer making real progress on aged inventory earns greater flexibility to replenish current product. A dealer continuing to accumulate aged inventory does not receive unlimited additional capacity simply because there is room left on its floor plan line.
Now the credit facility becomes a part of the workout and I wouldn’t become rigid about curtailments either. That could be self-defeating if an otherwise viable dealer reaches a scheduled curtailment and forcing that payment today would consume cash the dealer needs to continue operating selling inventory and absorbing the losses already sitting in that inventory. I’m better off granting a forbearance, but I would be pitching and catching with the manufacturer.
If I give the dealer additional time, I want the manufacturer to extend its repurchase protection for the same period. The dealer gets the time to sell the unit. The bank preserves its secondary source of repayment and the manufacturer avoids triggering an immediate repurchase. There is one critical difference between that and the pitch and catch we have been describing throughout this video. This time the inventory pool has to shrink. Forbearance is being used to facilitate a defined workout, not to postpone recognition while replacement inventory keeps entering faster than the old inventory is leaving.
I would also begin strengthening the manufacturer’s repurchase backs stop. I would not try to capitalize billions of dollars of contingent exposure overnight. That would create another liquidity problem. But for every new unit financed into the dealer channel, I would consider requiring the manufacturer to contribute a small amount into a restricted reserve account controlled for the benefit of its floor plan lenders. Leave the manufacturer with enough capital to operate.
Begin putting real financial resources under the repurchase promise. Right now, manufacturers can have billions of dollars of contingent repurchase exposure supported by remarkably small loss reserves. Over time, I would want that secondary source of repayment to become progressively better capitalized. Throughout this workout, my objective as the lender would be straightforward. Bring production and retail demand back into equilibrium.
We don’t have to wait until the last excess motor home sells before the economics begin getting better. As months of supply decline, turns increase. As turns increase, gross profits improve. The dealer begins generating more earnings from the same inventory. That gives the dealer greater capacity to absorb the remaining losses. The workout becomes easier as it succeeds. And most importantly, when the overhang is cleared, we are not going back to business as usual by financing 100% of the manufacturer’s invoice on behalf of the dealer.
Again, if I am the bank, I want every dealer to know today what my ultimate equity requirement will be once supply and demand return to equilibrium. That gives the dealer time to prepare. It can retain earnings. It can reduce distributions. It can sell assets. It can shrink or it can find additional permanent outside capital. And that exposes another structural weakness in this industry. The RV industry is woefully under capitalized. In many respects, it always has been. This industry was largely built by entrepreneurs who started on a shoestring, scratched and clawed and reinvested what they could and eventually created valuable dealerships and manufacturers.
I truly admire that. But very little net new permanent equity has entered the operating businesses themselves. Outside capital has certainly entered the RV industry, but much of it came through acquisitions. And acquisition capital is a Uturn. A buyer brings capital into the transaction, the seller receives it, and then the seller leaves with it. The ownership changed, but the operating business was not recapitalized.
That is fundamentally different from the way many growing businesses developed. A company proves that its business model works. The opportunity becomes larger than the founders’s balance sheet. Outside investors contribute new equity to fund future growth. The capital remains in the company, the balance sheet becomes stronger. That has happened remarkably very little in the RV industry because once financing 100% of the manufacturer’s invoice ends, dealers will need meaningful permanent equity to support their inventories. They need to know that now, not because I want their cash today as their lender. I don’t.
I want them using today’s liquidity to survive the workout and absorb the losses already embedded in their inventories. But when equilibrium returns, the dealer needs to be prepared to fund part of its own inventory. Unfortunately, poor capital allocation decisions do not stay isolated inside the company that made them. I have said throughout my business career that the worst thing in business is a dumb competitor. The only thing worse is trying to keep up with him.
A dumb competitor, a dumb capital allocator, if you will, distorts pricing. It compresses margins. It creates excess inventory. It weakens residual values. And it forces more discounting. And above all else, it increases the cost of ownership for the customers who pay my paycheck because excessive inventory is the cause of excess depreciation for motor home owners. I want this industry to become economically rational because I want capital, including our own capital, to earn the return it should. Well-run businesses should be able to earn returns sufficient to attract and retain capital.
That is where I would want this workout to end. Not with healthy dealers starved of credit. Not with manufacturers unable to operate. And not with the same financing structure waiting to recreate the next even larger inventory overhang. I want the existing losses worked through deliberately, production and retail demand returned to equilibrium and both dealer and manufacturers given enough time to prepare for a better capital structure on the other side.
Because if we simply clear 44,078 excess motor homes and then go right back to financing 100% of the manufacturers invoice the next inventory cycle, we have accomplished nothing. None of what I am describing will be painless. Dealer growth will slow. Some dealers will qualify for less credit. Some dealers will need more equity. Weaker operators will pay more for their capital. The weakest dealers will cease to exist.
Manufacturers will have to reduce production. Some factories will eventually close. Some brands will disappear. Some floor plans will disappear. And manufacturers may have to carry more inventory on their own balance sheets. All of that is painful. But compare it with the alternative we just saw in manufactured housing. dealer failures, manufacturer failures, lender failures, forced liquidations, factory closures, credit contraction, capital destruction, and years of rebuilding. After the market imposed discipline, the participants were unwilling to impose themselves.
The choice is not between discipline and pain. The choice is between discipline before the losses and distress after the losses. If the numbers are right, the source of capital has an opportunity to change this industry deliberately before losses force it to change it involuntarily. Which brings us to the next question. What would the RV industry look like afterwards? We have spent most of this video trying to understand why production has been able to separate from retail demand.
Now I want to turn the question around.
Chapter 13: What Would the Industry Look Like After?
Suppose the banks began underwriting dealers on the strength of the dealer’s own balance sheets, required dealers to contribute real equity to their inventory, and stopped allowing the manufacturers repurchase agreement to be a substitute for dealer capital. What if banks underwrote RV dealers the same way they underwrite every other commercial borrower they financed? What would actually happen? How much production would actually have to come out?
How many motor home dealers can the industry economically support? How many makes can the industry economically support? And what return should capital actually earn? Let’s begin with production. For the trailing 12 months ended June 30th, 2026, manufacturers shipped 39,159 motor homes. Retail customers purchased 31,629 motor homes. Before we even address a single unit of excess inventory already sitting in the channel, production would need to fall from 39,159 motor homes to 31,629 motor homes simply to stop making the problem worse.
That is 7,530 motor homes. A 19.23% reduction from the current rate of shipments. Measured the other way, shipments are 23.8 81% higher than retail purchases. Those are different percentages answering different questions. And that only gets production back into equilibrium with current demand. It does absolutely nothing about the inventory already sitting on dealers lots. As of June 30th, 2026, the calculated inventory overhang is 44,078 motor homes.
At 31,629 trailing 12 month retail motor home registrations, that is 16.72 months of supply. Remember what I meant when I call 4.07 months of supply our financial break even point. I am not suggesting that 4.07 07 months of supply is some perfect operational inventory level arbitrarily selected. No. Using Camping World’s 5.89% floor plan rate as reported on June 30th, 2026 and the same 2% historical gross profit per turn that we established in chapter 6.
The dealer needs 2.95 turns just to generate enough gross profit to cover flooring interest. 12 months divided by 2.95 is 4.07 months of motor home supply. 31,629 divided by 2.95 = 10,740 motor homes. So we have two separate problems. First, annual production has to decline 19.23% simply to equal current retail demand. Second, another 33,338 motor homes already sitting in the dealer channel have to be sold before the dealer body gets back to that 4.07 month supply.
That only gets floor plan economics back to a financial break even. The obvious question is how long should that reasonably take? Well, let’s stress test it. Start with one year. If every motor home manufacturer in America stopped producing motor homes tomorrow and did not build another one for an entire year and retail motor home sales stayed at 31,629, the industry would only sell 31,629 motor homes out of the existing inventory overhang. we would still have 44,078 motor homes minus 31,629 motor homes sold, leaving the dealers with 12,449 motor homes on their lots.
Our financial break even inventory is 10,740 motor homes. One year is clearly not enough time. If we clear the excess over 2 years, 16,669 of the annual retail sales have to come out of inventory already sitting in the channel each year. That leaves manufacturers room to produce 14,960 new motor homes a year. Compared with today’s 39,159 trailing 12 month shipment rate, production would have to fall 62%. stretch the correction to three years and manufacturers can produce 20,516 motor homes a year.
Production would still have to fall 48%. Stretch it all the way to four years and manufacturers can produce 23,294 motor homes a year. Production still has to fall 41%. That is the manufacturing side of the correction. And all of this assumes demand does not decline any further. I certainly would not bet on that. Look at what has actually happened. Motor home retail sales were 53,536 in 2020. They fell to 49,659. Then 42,897, then 39,800, then 35,811, then 33,54. And for the trailing 12 months into June 30th, 2026, they have fallen again to 31,629 motor homes.
From 2020 to trailing 12 months into June 30th, 2026, retail motor home sales have declined 40.92%. The 7,530 motor homes on the last row of graphic 13.3 is the current annualized gap between trailing 12 months of shipments and trailing 12 months of retail sales. The 5,63 motor home surplus in chapter 5 is the additional cumulative overhang created during just the first 6 months of 2026. Those are not the same number.
One is 12 months and the other is six months. Retail demand has now been declining for five and a half straight years. Retail motor home sales kept telling the industry the same thing year after year. Build less. Yet manufacturers shipped more motor homes than customers purchased in 2021. They did it again in 2022. Again in 2023. After briefly shipping fewer motor homes than retail sales in 2024, they went right back to a surplus in 2025.
And today they are shipping at a trailing 12 month rate of 39,159 motor homes into a market purchasing just 31,629 motor homes. 5 1/2 years of declining retail demand and manufacturers are currently shipping 23.81% 81% more motor homes than customers are buying. At some point, we have to stop calling that a forecasting problem. The demand signal could hardly be more clear. But production is only half the story.
The other half is what happens to the value of those motor homes while everybody waits for them to clear the channel. I’m putting the same chapter 8 mark to market back on the screen. I’m not inventing a new depreciation curve because we have reached the last chapter. I am using the same 2027 class A diesel proxy we used in chapter 8 against the 2027 invoice. The 2026 wholesale book value is down 20%. 25 is down 27.3%. 2024 is down 33.1% and 2023 is down 37.3%. Those are four separate comparisons to the same invoice.
You do not add them. Same chapter 8 mark to market. $9.017 billion at invoice, $1.06 billion of losses already sitting in the overhang. That is an 11.76% embedded loss. That table is the loss as of today. It doesn’t tell us what it’s going to cost us to hold the inventory from this point forward until the channel has been cleared. The 33,338 motor homes over and above the 10,740 the channel can carry at floor plan break even represents $6.82 billion at original invoice.
After today’s 11.76% mark to market, those 33,338 motor homes are worth $6.02 billion. I’m not going to count those losses again. We have already counted them in chapter 8. What I want to know now is much simpler. How much additional loss occurs from today until those 33,338 motor homes have been sold? Well, start with today’s estimated market value. Assume 10% annual depreciation and the excess sells evenly.
Then add 5.89% floor plan interest to the inventory while it remains unsold. And that 10% depreciation is not a guess. The 2022 Fleetwood Discovery LXE 44S we used in chapter 8 fell from $33,450 in March of 2022 to $198,550 in March of 2026. That is a 34.5% decline over four years or 10.06% compounded. I simply rounded down to 10%. Those figures exclude the dealer’s operating expense, manufacturer assistance, warranty, lot rot, and any further pressure on values from continued overproduction.
Bottom line, there is no painless correction left. Correct faster and manufacturers take a much larger production hit. Correct slower and the industry creates substantially more economic loss while the inventory continues aging. Stretching out the correction doesn’t eliminate the loss. It only compounds it. 2 years would create an extraordinary shock to manufacturing. 3 years is still extremely painful.
Four years merely trades some production pain today for substantially greater economic destruction tomorrow. That is why I have a difficult time defending a voluntary correction that takes longer than 3 years. If we use three years, production falls from 39,159 motor homes a year to 20,516 motor homes a year while the excess is worked out of the channel. No doubt the voluntary correction will hurt.
That raises the next question. If the industry ultimately has to produce much closer to what customers actually buy, how many dealerships can that demand economically support? This is where I think the automobile industry becomes extremely useful. The comparison is not perfect. Automobiles and motor homes do have a great deal in common economically. Both are expensive depreciating assets. Both are distributed predominantly through dealers.
Both dealers floor plan their inventories. Both customers frequently finance their purchase. Both dealers take trades and generate FNI income. Both require physical facilities, salespeople, technicians, parts, inventories, technology, and significant working capital. And in both businesses, the quality of the service operation becomes enormously important after the sale. So rather than guessing what a rational motor home dealer network might look like, let’s look at an industry that has already been forced by capital markets to operate with much greater efficiency.
The US automobile industry sells more than 16 million new cars and light trucks annually through 17,000 franchised new vehicle dealerships. The amount of new vehicle revenue flowing through the average automobile rooftop is 45 million to 50 million a year. Now compare that with new motor homes. SSI reports that 31,629 motor homes were sold during the trailing 12 months into June 30th, 2026. The weighted average invoice across all those motor home classes is $24,561. 31,629* $24,561 equals 6.47 47 billion of annual new motor home volume at invoice.
That is not the selling price. Gross profit is currently 1.44% of the sales price, not of the invoice. $6.47 billion divided by.9856 equals $6.56 billion of annual new motor home sales. SSI also reports 1121 motor home dealer rooftops in the United States as of June 30th, 2026. 6.565 billion divided by 1121 rooftops equals 5,856,000 of new motor home revenue per rooftop. The automobile dealer has eight times as much new vehicle revenue flowing through each rooftop.
Both businesses are selling new motorized vehicles. One is an automobile, the other is a motor home. Yet both still require land, buildings, management, accounting, salespeople, technicians, parts, technology, insurance, utilities, advertising, and working capital. Before we ever get to the quality of the management, the average motor home dealer begins with an enormous structural capital disadvantage.
There simply is not enough economic throughput flowing across the average rooftop. So, let’s ask an uncomfortable question. How many motor home dealership rooftops would there be if the same amount of new vehicle revenue flowed through a motor home rooftop as flows through a mature new automobile dealership? At $50 million of new vehicle revenue per rooftop, $6.565 billion of motor home demand supports 131 rooftops.
At 45 million per rooftop, it supports 146 rooftops. I am not suggesting that 131 to 146 is some magical number handed down from Mount Si. Geography matters, service coverage matters, product differences matter. The precise economic equilibrium could be higher. But the purpose of the comparison is to establish the order of magnitude. If the industry has 1121 motor home dealer rooftops today, an automobile like capital efficiency points towards something dramatically closer to 131 to 146 rooftops than it does 1121 rooftops.
We do not have a small efficiency problem. We have a structural capital problem. And here is the critical point. I do not believe the manufacturers will voluntarily solve it. Why would they? More dealership rooftops give manufacturers more places to wholesale inventory. More rooftops create more aggregate floor plan borrowing capacity for the manufacturer to rent from the dealer. More borrowing capacity creates more wholesale demand. Manufacturers have every incentive to preserve as many dealer rooftops as possible.
The banks are the participants capable of doing the heavy lifting. Once banks require dealers to contribute real equity underneath inventory and underwrite the dealer’s ability to repay independently of the manufacturers’s repurchase agreement, something changes immediately. Dealer capital becomes scarce. The dealer can no longer expand simply because another dollar of floor plan capacity exists. If the dealer cannot provide the required equity, the dealer has choices.
It can shrink, can raise permanent capital, sell, merge, or leave. Nobody in Washington has to decide which dealership survives. No state motor home vehicle department has to decide it. No manufacturer has to voluntarily surrender distribution. Capital makes the decision. Using 140 rooftops is an illustrative midpoint. 1121 divided by 140 equals 8. Each remaining dealership now has eight times as much sales opportunity flowing through each rooftop.
And I do not believe it needs eight times as much inventory to handle those sales. The automobile industry tells us that high volume automobile dealers move inventory. They do not simply build parking lots eight times larger every time sales volume increases. The general manager does not cost eight times as much because the dealership sells eight times as many units. The accounting department does not cost eight times as much.
The building does not. The computer system does not. Advertising does not increase eight-fold. The surviving dealer gets operating leverage and with production discipline to retail demand, the dealer also gets inventory velocity. That combination completely changes the economics of the dealership. It creates earnings that can be reinvested in more technicians, better technician compensation, more training, more service pays, deeper parts inventories, better diagnostic equipment, better technology, better facilities, longer service hours, and more customer support.
For years, motor home owners have looked at the automobile industry and asked a very reasonable question. Why can’t motor home service work more like automobile service? Maybe we’ve been asking the wrong question there, too. Perhaps motor home service is not lagged automobile service merely because motor home dealers don’t care enough about service. Perhaps poor service is the downstream consequence of poor capital efficiency.
We have expected the motor home dealer to build automobile quality service infrastructure while giving that dealership only an eighth of the economic throughput available to an automobile dealer. Now look at what professionalized inventory velocity actually produces. I went through the 2025 results of six of the largest publicly traded franchise automobile dealers. Autoation, Lithia, Group One Automotive, Asbury Automotive Group, Penske Automotive Group, and Sonic Automotive.
I looked only at their new vehicle businesses. Collectively, those six companies generated 72.589 billion dollar of new vehicle revenue and $4.742 billion of new vehicle gross profit. That is a weighted average new vehicle gross profit margin of 6.53%. Their year-end new vehicle inventory supplies were 45 days at Autoation, 54 at Lithia, 46 at Group 1, 52 at Asbury, 49 at Pinsky, and 48 at Sonni.
The average is 49 days. 49 days of inventory is 7.35 turns a year. 6.53% gross profit times 7.35 turns is 47.99% of annual gross profit productivity on the inventory employed. That is not one automobile dealer doing something unusual. Six major publicly traded franchise automobile retailers operate with new vehicle inventories ranging from only 45 to 54 days. Five of the six are within 9 days of one another.
That is what competitive, professionally capitalized new vehicle retailing actually looks like. Now compare it with motor homes today. 2% gross profit per turn times 72 turns is 1.44% of annual gross profit productivity on the inventory employed. 47.99 divided by 1.44 is 33.33. Publicly traded automobile dealers are producing 33 times more annual gross profit productivity from the inventory they employed than the motor home dealer body is producing in today’s market. That is not a small operating difference.
That is a completely different capital model. And that is why I no longer believe the historical 2% motor home gross profit per turn tells us what a healthy motor home dealer should earn after this industry rationalizes. That 2% is not the product of a healthy equilibrium. It is the historical blended result of the system we have spent this entire video examining. It includes profitable sales, aged inventory, discounting, lock queens, and the destruction of margin required to clear products the industry built faster than customer purchased them.
Remove the disequilibrium, and there is no economic reason to assume that 2% remains the natural gross profit margin. A healthy new vehicle dealer earns margin and turns its inventory. It does not choose between the two. Dealer count is not the objective. Capital productivity is. If real dealer equity rationalizes an enormously over dealer distribution system, the next question becomes unavoidable. Why does an industry with a fraction of the automobile industry’s annual unit volume need anything close to the number of manufacturers makes floor plans it currently offers?
Because the motor home industry doesn’t just have too many units chasing too few customers. It has an extraordinary amount of product fragmentation chasing those same customers. Let’s begin at the manufacturer level. At December 31st, 2019, there were 36 motor home manufacturers selling at least five motor homes annually. Those manufacturers were competing for 52,074 annual retail customers. For the trailing 12 months into June 30th, 2026, there were 51 motor home manufacturers selling at least five motor homes annually.
But total annual retail demand had fallen to 31,629 motor homes. Retail demand fell from 52,74 motor homes to 31,629 motor homes, a decline of 39.26%. At the same time, the number of manufacturers meaningfully competing for those customers increased from 36 to 51, an increase of 41.67%. The market got dramatically smaller while the number of manufacturers dividing that market got dramatically larger. That last line may be the most important.
In 2019, there were 1447 annual retail customers supporting each meaningful motor home. manufacturer. By June 30th, 2026, there were only 620. The amount of annual customer demand supporting the average meaningful motor home manufacturer had fallen 57%. Now, compare that with automobiles. US automobile industry sold about 16.3 million new cars and light trucks in 2025 through 46 manufacturers.
That works out to 355,000 annual retail sales per automobile manufacturer. The motor home industry sold 31,629 motor homes through 51 meaningful manufacturers. That works out to 620 annual retail sales per motor home manufacturer. Before we even get down to individual makes, the automobile industry has 570 times more annual customer demand supporting each manufacturer. And we still haven’t gotten to makes for automobiles.
I used name plates because that is what SSI calls a make. On the motor home side using the manufacturers for which detailed name plate sales are available. The automobile industry sold 16.3 million vehicles across 306 distinct makes or name plates. That means the average automobile make was supported by 53,268 annual retail customers. Now compare that with motor home. According to SSI, as of June 30th, 2026, the motor home industry had 386 makes competing for only 31,629 annual retail customers. 31,629 divided by 386 equals 82 annual retail customers per motor home make.
The automobile industry has about 650 times more customer demand supporting each make. That is not a small difference. That is a completely different level of production fragmentation. And even that understates the problem because a make is still not the bottom of the funnel. A customer doesn’t buy a make in the abstract. A customer buys a specific model, length, floor plan, chassis, engine, interior, paint combination, and option package.
So those 386 motor home makes fragment again into even more models, lengths, and floor plans. Every time the industry creates another variation, it divides the same finite customer demand into another smaller bucket. Each make is a claim on capital. Supporting it requires capital for engineering, design, tooling, marketing, sales management, dealer representation, parts, warranty support, technical documentation, training, supplier relationships, inventory, and working capital.
Then every model underneath that make requires more. Every length underneath that model requires more. Every floor plan underneath that length requires more. Again, eventually the arithmetic becomes absurd. Take the average motor home make today. It is supported by only 82 annual retail customers nationwide. Suppose that make offers six floor plans. 82 divided by 6 equals 14 annual retail customers per floor plan. 14 customers across the entire United States.
If that make offers 10 floor plans falls to eight annual customers per floor plan. And remember, those customers are not all shopping at one rooftop. They are spread across the entire country and across hundreds of dealer rooftops. Now ask multiple dealerships to stock examples of each floor plan. The mathematics stop working almost immediately. Then add multiple lengths, paint schemes, interiors, chassis configurations, and option packages, and the probability that the exact motor home sitting on a particular dealer’s lot matches the exact customer walking through the door becomes smaller still.
So, what does the current system do? It builds more configurations, puts more inventory on more dealers lots, and finances all of it. But we established something much earlier in this video. Inventory is not demand. Building another configuration does not create another customer. It merely divides the same customer demand across more inventory. The manufacturer is effectively asking can I find enough dealer borrowing capacity to distribute this product.
That is not the same question as is there enough retail demand to economically support this product. Require real dealer equity and the question changes overnight. Every dealer has a finite amount of permanent capital. Every additional manufacturer competes for that capital. Every additional make competes for that capital. Every additional model and floor plan competes for that capital. And the dealer begins asking a much more rational question.
Why should I put my money into this motor home instead of that one? Which manufacturer turns faster? Which make produces the better return? Which floor plan consistently sells? Which one has a stronger residual value? Which one produces fewer defects? Which one requires less warranty work? Which manufacturer protects the dealer’s capital instead of destroying it? That is a completely different competition. Manufacturers stop competing merely for dealer floor plan capacity.
They begin competing for dealer equity. And equity is far more discriminating than debt. Once real capital is required, weak manufacturers, makes and floor plans cannot hide beneath aggregate volume. The dealer sees exactly what each product is doing to its money. And when something becomes expensive, behaviors change. Dealers order fewer weak products. Manufacturers build fewer weak products. Weak floor plans disappear. Weak makes disappear.
Weak manufacturers disappear or consolidate. Production becomes concentrated around the products customers actually buy. Not because a consultant tells the industry it has too many makes. Not because I say it has too many makes. Because capital stops funding products that cannot earn an adequate return. Think about what the automobile industry has learned over more than a century of mass production. Successful automotive name plates are supported by tens of thousands and often hundreds of thousands of annual customers.
Engineering costs are spread across enormous production runs. Suppliers, manufacturers, the same components repeatedly. Assembly workers build the same products again and again. Dealers sell the same models repeatedly. Technicians repair the same vehicles repeatedly. parts department stock components for products with enormous installed population. That repetition creates efficiency and quality.
The motor home industry has done almost the opposite. It has divided 31,629 annual customers among 51 meaningful manufacturers and 386 makes before we even descend into models, lengths, and floor plans. And then everyone wonders why parts are difficult. Technician training is difficult. Warranty administration is difficult. Quality control is difficult. Residual values are inconsistent. Inventory turns are poor.
And service is expensive. Those are not independent problems. They are all connected. If a manufacturer builds 10 examples of a floor plan, it gets 10 opportunities to learn. If it builds 1,000, it gets 1,000 opportunities to learn. The production team sees the same assembly sequence repeatedly. Engineering sees recurring defects sooner. Suppliers receive more consistent demand. Warranty patterns become easier to identify.
Service technicians encounter the same systems more frequently. Parts demand becomes more predictable. Every repetition creates another learning opportunity. The automobile industry has built extraordinary quality partly because it manufactures enormous quantities of highly standardized products. The motor home industry frequently tries to achieve the same level of quality by manufacturing a tiny quantity of extraordinarily complex products with enormous configuration variability.
I know what some customers will hear when I say fewer manufacturers, fewer makes, and fewer floor plans. They will hear fewer choices. That is not what I mean. I mean fewer economically unsustainable choices. A healthier industry could offer fewer products that are better engineered, better built, better supported, easier to service, easier to find parts for, have higher resale values and are manufactured in sufficient volume to continuously improve.
That is actually more consumer choice where it matter. And once again, notice who drives the rationalization. It is not primarily the manufacturers. A manufacturer with excess capacity naturally wants more products to run through the factory, another make, another model, another floor plan, another configuration, another reason for a dealer to order another unit. But once banks require real dealer equity, the dealer cannot say yes to everything. The dealer’s capital becomes the governor.
The motor home industry does not need fewer good products. It needs fewer products that exist only because somebody was willing to finance them. Which brings us to the last question. What return should capital earn? None of that matters unless the business that survives can earn an adequate return on the capital required to operate them. I do not want my opinion to answer that question. Capital markets have spent decades establishing required returns for different levels of risk.
One accepted approach for a private company is the buildup method. Start with the risk-free rate. Add the equity risk premium. Add a size premium. Then add a company specific return. The 10-year Treasury on September 23rd, 2026 is 5.11%. Add the equity size and company specific premiums on that screen and the required return on a private dealership equity comes to 18.61%. That is the return equity capital should require for that risk.
But return on equity can be easily increased by simply adding leverage. So to more accurately compare the underlying economic productivity of businesses with different capital structures, we need to use return on invested capital or ROIC. Look at what capital actually earned over long periods. Look at the windows. Thor, the largest RV manufacturer in the world, earned 13.99% ROIC over 20 years, 13.6% over 15 years, 12.14% over 10 years, and 10.11% over 5 years.
The closer you get today, the worse the return. CAVCO in manufactured housing earned 12.19% over 20 years, 14.38% over 15 years. 19.3% over 10 years and 24.21% over 5 years. The closer you get to today, the better the return. Manufactured housing already went through its correction. Capacity left. The remaining capital started earning more. The RV industry has not done that yet. Thor shrinking ROIC is what it looks like when an industry is still protecting volume on the way into the problem, not coming out of it.
Those are observable long-term returns in this industry and in a closely comparable factory-built housing business. That is why I use 12 to 15% long-term ROIC as a capital market benchmark with 15% as the objective. The return I am suggesting the RV industry should earn is not theoretical. It’s the return capital can already earn somewhere else. Now compare that historical benchmark with current RV economics. Camping World’s trailing 12 months return on invested capital through June 30th, 2026 was negative 5.08%. Its return on equity was negative 26.53%. Lazy Day shows how quickly capital returns can collapse.
ROIC was about 14.7% in 2021, 8.8% in 2022. negative 9.4% in 2023 and negative 15.9% in 2024. That is capital destruction. Revenue can grow while value is being destroyed. Market share can grow while value is being destroyed. Unit sales can grow while value is being destroyed. Growth creates value only when the incremental return on the capital required to produce that growth exceeds the cost of that capital.
When it does not, growth destroys value. Which brings us right back to inventory. You do not need higher industry volume. You need less capital chasing inventory. The customer never asked to be built. And what is most near and dear to my heart, residual values increase, excess depreciation is eliminated, and our customers cost of ownership plummets, which will attract more customers. The motor home industry stops its 42-year decline and starts to grow again.
That is the opportunity on the other side of this problem. Not merely better margins for manufacturers. Not merely better returns for dealers, banks, and shareholders, a healthier economic model for customers. The objective is not motor home volume, factory utilization, dealer count, or the amount of inventory financed in the channel. The objective is an adequate return on the capital required to serve the customer. At some point, you cannot fall out of a basement.
If you have made it this far, thank you. I knew there was no honest way to have this conversation
Conclusion & Final Thoughts
in 20 minutes. So, you just watched a semester’s worth of information on the RV industry. My goal with this video was to understand why the motor home industry, which creates a product people genuinely love, has spent 42 years shrinking in both the motor homes it ships and the motor homes it sells. The people ultimately paying the largest price for the current incentives are the people this industry exists to serve, the customer.
They pay through excess depreciation. They pay through lower residual values. They pay through a higher cost of ownership. Eventually, some decide the lifestyle costs too much. That is what I want to change. I want manufacturers to earn healthy returns. I want dealers to earn healthy returns. I want banks to make good loans and earn appropriate returns. I want employees throughout this industry to have long successful careers.
I want more people to discover the lifestyle so many of us love. And I want to leave this industry better than I found it. Those objectives are not in conflict. In a healthy economic system, they reinforce one another. For most of my career, whenever I encountered a business problem, I tried to understand the people making the decisions. This time, I found that people were responding to incentives the system had given them.
The question was never as simple as why does the RV industry keep overproducing? The real question was, why wouldn’t it? Everyone in the chain has been incentivized to ship one more motor home. If you’ve invested this much time, you are probably asking yourself two questions. How large is the hole? And when will the correction happen? Unfortunately, there is no way to know the amount of equity in a dealer body that is almost entirely private.
We can, however, put the losses next to the revenues. $1.06 06 billion of losses is already embedded in the motor home inventory overhang. Plus $1.51 billion more if we assume 3 years to clear the 33,338 excess motor homes equals $2.57 billion. That is 39.1% of $6.565 billion of annual new motor home sales in today’s market. Remember, this only measures losses in motor homes.
It does not measure losses in travel trailers and fifth wheels if they were equally overbuilt. For perspective, motor homes are 40% of RV sales in dollars. If trailers and fifth wheels are in the same condition, total losses in the RV industry could reach $6.43 [snorts] billion. Now, come back to motor homes only because that is what we measure. In a grossly overbuilt motor home market, coupled with a frothy stock market and rising interest rates, next year’s demand is almost certain to be even lower, which will only add to that $2.57 billion in losses on lower revenues, meaning the 39.1% is destined to grow again next year.
As to the timing, you never know which year was the bottom of any market decline until you see it in the rearview mirror. And that year is almost always the most painful year of the decline. Unfortunately, declines in leveraged inventory businesses are not polite straight lines. They look manageable until the final straw that breaks the camel’s back. When it comes to the timing of an impending correction in the motor home market, I believe Hemingway summed it up best.
In the Sun Also Rises, Bill Gorton asked, “How did you go bankrupt?” Mike Campbell answered, “Two ways. Gradually, then suddenly.” Most corrections have three phases. The first is orderly. Prices fall, demand slows, and the industry still talks about a soft landing or a pause. We pass through this phase during 2021 and 2022. The second phase is grinding, margins compress, inventory builds, and the weaker players start to cut.
This is the phase we’ve been in since 2022. Whether we remain in this phase throughout 2027 remains to be seen. The third phase is the last leg. That is when remaining holders are forced to sell, credit tightens or disappears and the narrative shifts from temporary to structural. Forced liquidation, covenant breaches and bankruptcies cluster there. Liquidity dries up at the same time the need for it is its highest.
That is why the final leg is usually the sharpest and why the casualties are concentrated at the bottom, not on the way down. The industry has been shrinking in motor home shipments and sales for 42 years. The pandemic was a dead cat bounce. The motor home inventory overhang we measured has been building for 5 and 1/2 years. We are certainly closer to the suddenly than we were 5 and a half years ago. In closing, change the incentives and we change both the chronic overproduction and the industry.
Thank you again for taking this much time out of your lives to listen to my musings. I wish you all safe travels and only the best. Thank you for watching.

